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This thesis studies how two US presidents, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, aim to 
(de)legitimate their respective decisions on either to join the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change or to withdraw from it. The two presidents’ uses of discursive legitimation strategies 
are compared to see how they differ or resemble each other. In addition, the study examines 
how the used strategies relate to the larger socio-political context of the US and two different 
administrations and parties in terms of their respective climate policies.  
 
In order to examine what strategies the presidents used, a combination typology of 
legitimation strategies by Van Leeuwen (2007 and 2008) and Reyes (2011) was employed. 
The study also aimed to test how well the legitimation framework worked with this kind of 
topic, since it has not been previously applied similarly. A total of five presidential 
statements were analysed with the method of close reading.  
 
The analysis found that there were more differences than similarities between the presidents. 
Obama used mostly positive legitimation and the strategies of altruism, mythopoesis and 
moral evaluation, while Trump employed mostly negative delegitimation and the strategies 
of authorization, hypothetical future and rationalization. Noteworthy was that Obama 
employed all strategies, but Trump did not use altruism at all. This provides a niche for 
further research. It was concluded that the used strategies relate to the policies of the 
presidents’ political parties. Future research could study more profoundly the divide in US 
climate policies in terms of discursive legitimation. The study proved that the legitimation 
framework could be applied to a topic of this kind. However, the framework could be tested 
and developed further, since there are still some limitations.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
People around the globe are already affected by the consequences of climate change, and 
scientific evidence for human-caused global warming is wide-ranging and growing 
(IPCC 2018). Effective means need to be developed and implemented to tackle climate 
change. However, this is a global challenge that no country alone can tackle. That is why 
international cooperation and common solutions are needed. After a long round of 
negotiations, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change was reached on 12 December 2015 
at the 21st annual Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The aim of this international agreement is to tackle global 
warming, accelerate climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and to secure the 
necessary finance for this. 
 
As a wealthy superpower in world politics and the second largest emitter country of 
carbon dioxide (Global carbon Atlas 2019), it was seen crucial that the United States (the 
US) would be part of the Paris Agreement to set an example for other countries. The 
participation of the US in the agreement is dependent on how the leadership of the country 
perceives climate change and how much importance it places on tackling global warming. 
There is a partisan divide on climate politics between the two main political parties in the 
US. The Democrats tend to believe more in human-caused climate change and are thus 
more willing to push policies against global warming. By contrast, the Republicans tend 
to be more sceptical about humans' role in climate change and object climate action 
related policies more than the Democrats.  
 
The US administration at the time of the Paris Agreement procedure was headed by 
President Barack Obama, a Democrat, and the US signed the agreement (on 22 April 
2016) and formally joined it (on 3 September 2016) under his leadership. However, on 1 
June 2017 the following president Donald Trump, a Republican, informed his 
administration’s intention to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. The 
announcement came after months of speculation whether this would actually happen, as 
already during his presidential campaign Trump had informed his intention of leaving the 
pact.  
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This study aims to find out how the two US presidents from two different administrations 
and political parties (de)legitimate their decisions relating to the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change. It is important to examine in detail how the leadership of the US aims 
to legitimate their actions and whether these ways differ between the two political parties, 
since these decisions could potentially have a much larger impact on the rest of the world. 
 
The US and its role in relation to the Paris Agreement has been studied for instance by 
Kienast (2015), Kemp (2017a) and Pavone (2018). However, the topic has not been 
approached yet from the perspective of discursive legitimation, and hence this study fills 
that research gap. 
 
In this thesis I conduct a case study and compare statements by the two presidents. The 
study will answer the following research questions:  
 
1. What discursive (de)legitimation strategies presidents Barack Obama and Donald 
Trump use to justify the decision to join the Paris Agreement and to withdraw 
from it? 
2. How the presidents’ uses of the strategies differ from or resemble each other? 
3. How the used strategies relate to the larger socio-political context, and especially 
to the two different US political parties and administrations in terms of their 
respective climate related policies? 
 
To answer the first research question, a typology of legitimation strategies is used. This 
typology, which also is the theoretical framework of this study, is adapted from the 
legitimation strategies identified by Van Leeuwen (2007 and 2008) and by Reyes (2011). 
I combine the two researchers’ work to form a framework suitable for the study. The 
analysis section will answer the first research question. I delve into the two other 
questions more in the discussion section, in which I combine the results of the analysis. 
The strategies used by both presidents are compared to each other to see how different or 
similar their use of the legitimations is. I also discuss how this usage relates to the larger 
socio-political context of the US. Based on former research done on US climate politics 
and the US in relation to the Paris Agreement, my hypothesis is that the two presidents, 
Obama and Trump, differ in their use of the legitimation strategies, because they represent 
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opposing political parties with different views on human-caused climate change. 
Therefore, they will aim to legitimate their respective decisions based on different issues.  
 
One objective of this thesis is also to test how well the legitimation framework works 
with this kind of topic and data. Even though Van Leeuwen’s theory has been used for 
instance in relation to media discourse (Vaara 2014 and Kekki 2018) and political 
discourse (Pansardi and Battegazzorre 2018), it has not been explicitly applied to examine 
how US presidents legitimate certain decisions, especially in relation to climate change 
politics. This study aims to fill that gap.  
 
This thesis begins with an overview of the United Nations climate action and specifically 
the Paris Agreement. After this, I discuss relevant climate change politics in the US as 
some background information is necessary to understand the analysis. The theoretical 
framework of this thesis (legitimation) is then presented. In the second half of the thesis, 
I move to the specifics of the study, beginning with description of the material and 
methods. These are followed by the analysis of both presidents’ use of the legitimation 
strategies. In the discussion section, I will then compare the legitimation strategy uses 
and set the results within a wider socio-political context. The final chapter concludes the 
thesis by summarising the main points and setting future directions.  
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2 The Paris Agreement on Climate Change 
 
In this section I will give relevant background information on the United Nations climate 
action and the Paris Agreement and the role of the US in relation to it. This is a complex 
topic and a study examining this alone could be conducted. Due to limited space, only 
issues that are most relevant for this study will be discussed. It is important to know the 
main features of the Paris Agreement, its legal procedure and the US part in all of this to 
understand the analysis and its results.   
 
Before proceeding to the section, I want to briefly note that while this thesis discusses 
both climate change and global warming, the two are essentially different concepts. 
Climate change consists of a variety of different phenomena, while global warming is 
only one type of climate phenomenon. For the purposes of this thesis, the difference is 
not fundamental and the two are often used as meaning the same. However, it is important 
to be aware of the de facto difference. 
 
2.1 Overview of United Nations Climate Action and the Paris Agreement 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an 
international treaty, which was adopted on 9 May 1992 and entered into force on 21 
March 1994. The purpose was to create a framework for international climate policy and 
cooperation, as well as to develop a common response to tackling climate change 
(UNFCCC 2018a). UNFCCC recognizes humans’ role in causing climate change. An 
excessive increase of (human-caused) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has resulted in 
warming of the planet. One type of GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which are 
mostly created in energy and industrial production for example by burning fossil fuels 
(coal, gas, oil), flaring and cement production (Ritchie and Roser 2017). Reducing CO2 
emissions would limit global warming (IPCC 2018). The main objective of UNFCCC is: 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992, 
Article 2). UNFCCC currently has 197 Parties meaning states (and the EU) that have 
agreed to the treaty by ratifying it. The Parties meet yearly at the Conference of Parties 
(COP), which is the highest decision-making body of the Convention (UNFCCC 2018a; 
2018b).   
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The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was the first attempt of UNFCCC to reduce GHG emissions. 
However, the agreement did not prove effective. The non-ratification of the US was seen 
as one of the reasons for the failure of the Protocol (see Pickering et al. 2018 and Falkner 
2016 for more). The next major step in international climate change politics was COP15 
in Copenhagen in 2009, which, however, was also been seen as a failure in some ways 
(Falkner 2016, 1111). According to Falkner, COP15 still formed the beginning of 
negotiating a completely new approach to climate action. In addition, setting up Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) was first proposed during COP15 (ibid.). GCF was established at 
COP16 in 2010 to become part of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. The aim of GCF 
is to support developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions and assist their climate 
change adaptation (Green Climate Fund 2018).  
 
Two years later at COP17 in Durban, South Africa, in 2011 the Parties agreed to form a 
new agreement on climate change by 2015 (Rajamani 2016, 494). This fully generated a 
long round of negotiations on what was to become the Paris Agreement (henceforth 
referred to as the PA). A major push in the negotiations came on 12 November 2014, 
when the US and China announced a joint effort on climate change1. Consequently, the 
PA was reached at the twenty-first annual Conference of Parties (COP21) on 12 
December 2015 in Paris, France. It is an international agreement adopted by the Parties 
to the UNFCCC to tackle climate change and to speed up actions towards a sustainable 
low carbon future. Article 2 of the PA (UNFCCC 2015) presents its main aims: 
 
“This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its 
objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in 
the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: 
(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of 
climate change; 
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change 
and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions 
development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and 
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” 
 
                                                 
1 U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change (The White House 2014) 
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The aims of the PA could be summarized as climate change mitigation (a), climate 
change adaptation (b) and climate finance (c). Mitigation refers to actions limiting the 
extent of the effects of climate change, meaning the reduction of GHG emissions. 
According to the PA, Parties will “pursue domestic mitigation measures” (UNFCCC 
2015, Article 4, Paragraph 2). These mitigation actions could be, for instance, renewable 
energy solutions or new kinds of transport modes in order to reduce use of fossil fuels as 
energy source. Adaptation, on the other hand, refers to “strengthening resilience and 
reducing the vulnerability to climate change” (UNFCCC 2015, Article 7, Paragraph 1). 
In other words, adaptation means developing solutions and action as a response to the 
consequences of climate change. Even though mitigation through reducing GHG 
emissions exponentially would be successful, irreversible climate change effects are 
already happening and need to be responded to. Adaptation measures can respond to 
already existing climate change effects or expected future consequences. An example of 
an adaptation action would be new infrastructure in response to changing situations, such 
as rising sea levels. Climate finance, then, connects with both mitigation and adaptation 
measures. In order to deliver these practices adequate financial resources are required. 
The PA assigned GCF a larger role in this regard.  
 
The PA is based on the principle of differentiation meaning that there are different 
expectations for different countries according to their national circumstances. Countries 
submit their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which are reassessed and 
presented every five years. Each Party to the agreement determines its own individual 
mitigation and adaptation obligations and then communicates these to the UNFCCC 
secretariat. Therefore, for instance, India's NDC differs from the US NDC, because the 
two countries have different situations as regards to emissions or development (Rajamani 
2017).  
 
The structure of the PA means that even though the agreement states common aims to all 
the signatories, it does not impose any specific obligations for them. Here the PA differs 
significantly from the Kyoto Protocol 2 , which set obligatory emission targets to its 
signatories (Pavone 2018, 37). The PA only binds signatory countries “to prepare, 
                                                 
2 See Falkner (2016) for more discussion on the differences between the PA and the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
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communicate and maintain NDCs, not to achieve them” (Rajamani 2017). Thus, the 
obligations of the agreement are not very demanding and there are no repercussions for 
breaching them.  
 
The PA followed the same three-stage path that most international agreements go through 
before entering into force (WRI 2018). First, an agreement is adopted. As stated above, 
the PA was adopted on 12 December 2015. “According to the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties, adoption is the formal act that establishes the form and content of an 
agreement” (ibid.). Second step is the signing. “Signing is important because it indicates 
a commitment by that country to refrain from act that would defeat the object and purpose 
of the Agreement” (ibid.). The PA was open for signing at the UN headquarters in New 
York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017. Then lastly, Parties formally join the 
agreement by submitting “an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval to the 
Secretary-General to the United Nations”. This can be done at any time after signing the 
agreement, as there is no time limit (ibid.). 
 
Article 21 of the PA (UNFCCC 2015) states the agreement enters into force thirty days 
after “at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 
per cent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” This threshold was achieved on 5 
October 2016 and hence the PA entered into force thirty days later, on 4 November 2016.  
 
Some regard the PA as an important step forwards in international climate action 
(Hermville 2016). However, the PA has also received criticism. For instance, scientist 
James Hansen states that the agreement contains only promises, not any action (Milman 
2015). Regardless of the opposing views, the PA is the first major international deal of 
the 21st century and the first agreement, which all Parties have agreed to (Pavone 2018, 
35). 
 
2.2 The United States and the Paris Agreement 
 
The US, with the lead of the Obama administration, adopted the PA at the same time as 
the other Parties to UNFCCC, on 12 December 2015 at COP21 in Paris. Then on the first 
day the signing opened, on 22 April 2016, the US signed the agreement together with 174 
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other countries. The US formally joined the PA on 3 September 2016 at the same time 
with China. This was seen as a crucial step. Figure 1 below presents the top 5 countries 
in the world with the largest CO2 emissions in 2017 (Global Carbon Atlas 2019).  
 
 
Figure 1 Top 5 countries with the largest CO2 emissions in 2017 (Global Carbon Atlas 
2019) 
 
As can be seen from figure 1, the US and China are the two largest emitter countries of 
CO2 emissions. They represent approximately 40 % of the whole world’s CO2 emissions, 
which in 2017 were 36 153 MtCO₂ or approximately 36 gigatons of CO2 (Global Carbon 
Atlas 2019). Thus, the US and China formally joining the PA was seen as an important 
step towards the agreement formally entering into force, as the PA was now much closer 
to reaching the necessary threshold for this (see section 2.1). 
 
Another point on the significance of the US joining the climate agreement is that the CO2 
emissions per person in the country are high compared to the other top emitters, as figure 
2 demonstrates. 
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Figure 2 Per capita CO2 emissions of the top 5 emitter countries in 2017 (Global Carbon 
Atlas 2019) 
 
Figure 2 shows the per capita CO2 emissions of the top emitter countries (Global Carbon 
Atlas 2019), and as can be seen from the data, the US has by far the most per capita 
emissions among the top five emitter countries listed in figure 1. These statistics matter 
when considering the NDCs of each country, as for instance China's or India's NDC will 
differ from the US, because the countries have different circumstances. 
 
The US submitted its first NDC on 3 September 2016. The US committed: “to achieve 
an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28% below its 
2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.” (NDC 
Registry 2016). According to Climate Action Tracker (2018) the US NDC commitment 
is insufficient: if all Parties to the PA would have the same commitment, global 
temperature would be over 2oc and up to 3oc.  
 
Many regarded the US participation as a precondition for the success of the PA, since the 
US is a superpower and the second largest emitter after China (Kemp 2016, 1012). The 
US stance on certain international agreements, such as the PA, can send a meaningful 
message to other countries to also join the pact. Thus, the agreement was crafted in many 
parts to match US demands and the Obama administration was involved in the 
negotiations vigorously (Pavone 2018, 35). Domestic politics of the US influenced the 
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final structure of the PA and it was specifically designed so that the US would be able to 
adopt it (Kienast 2015, 321).  
 
The president is probably the most visible part of US politics and the institutional position 
represents a high authority figure. Despite this, presidential powers are limited due to the 
separation of powers in the US. Therefore, it is not a straightforward process for the US 
president to adopt an international treaty. According to the US Constitution, the president 
has the power to enter the country into a treaty only with two-thirds of the Senate backing 
the decision (Article II, Section 2). The US Congress consists of an upper chamber, 
Senate, and a lower chamber, House of Representatives. During the PA negotiations the 
majority in the 114th Congress was Republican in both chambers, and a Democrat 
administration would not have managed “a strong climate treaty” to pass the Senate 
(Kemp 2016, 1013). Other means had to be thought in order to get the US to adopt the 
PA.  
 
Hence, Obama administration leaned on the president’s executive powers in order to 
bypass the Senate. The PA was adopted through a presidential executive agreement rather 
than regarding it as a legally binding treaty. Kienast (2015, 321) states that the content of 
the agreement and how it relates to national law affects the president’s executive powers 
in this regard. The content of the PA needs to “reflect US law and previously ratified 
treaties” in order for it to be considered lawful (Kienast 2015, 324). The PA was labelled 
as an agreement instead of a treaty or a protocol. Moreover, the PA includes only non-
binding obligations to reduce emissions so that the US could adopt it. After his 
examination Kienast concludes that the US is lawfully bound to the PA, as it reflects 
existing treaty obligations (such as earlier UNFCCC ones) and national law and 
regulations (2015, 327).  
 
However, it is important to note that presidential executive agreements can be revoked 
by a future president or by Congress (Kemp 2017a, 88). Republicans criticised the 
adoption process of the PA seeing it as not legally acceptable (Pavone 2018, 38). Before 
the 2016 presidential elections, Kemp (2017a, 87) predicted that the US withdrawing 
from the PA is likely, if the future president is a Republican. This is exactly what 
happened. 
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Republican Party candidate Donald Trump was elected President of the United States 
four days after the PA formally entered into force, on 8 November 2016. From the start 
of the presidency, there was ongoing speculation about the possible withdrawal, since 
Trump had promised already during his campaign that he would withdraw the US from 
the agreement if elected (BBC News 2016). In May 2017, 22 Republicans sent a letter to 
Trump encouraging him to withdraw from the PA (The Associated Press 2017). 
Moreover, the president’s own advisors were divided on the issue and various groups 
lobbied the administration on both sides (Cooper 2018, 441). Finally, on 1 June 2017, 
Trump announced the intention of the US to leave the climate agreement. In addition to 
the withdrawal intention, Trump stated that the US would not be paying the remaining $2 
billion of a promised pledge to GCF. Back in 2014, Obama had pledged that the US would 
contribute $3 billion to GCF (see section 2.1 for more on GCF). Of this pledge, Obama 
was able to commit $1 billion before the end of his presidency (Mathiesen 2017). Trump’s 
announcement meant a great cutback on global climate finance.  
 
Urpelainen and Van de Graaf (2018, 840) argue that the US withdrawal and non-
cooperation would not have a dramatic impact on US emissions, but the decision to end 
climate finance, on the other hand, might affect future international climate cooperation 
negatively. Kemp (2017b) has studied Trump administration’s overall climate actions and 
interestingly concludes that those actions that have received the most attention and 
opposition (including the PA) might actually be the least damaging. While in contrast, 
the actions that have gotten less attention could have much more long-term influence on 
the US policies. Trump administration’s other climate related policies are discussed in 
section 3.2.  
 
To conclude this section, it is important to note that the withdrawal announcement does 
not mean that the US will be able to withdraw from the agreement immediately. 
According to Article 28 of the PA (UNFCCC 2015), a signatory Party may withdraw 
from the PA after three years from the date of the agreement’s entry into force by giving 
written notification. This withdrawal will then take effect one year after the written 
notification. Thus, the PA entered into force on 4 November 2016, which means the US 
can give its official withdrawal notification at the earliest in 2019, and fully exist the PA 
in November 2020 around the time of the next presidential elections. If Trump is not re-
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elected the next president could re-enter the US to the PA through an executive agreement 
(Kemp 2017b, 3).  
 
This section has outlined international climate action, the PA and US role in relation to 
it. Figure 3 below summarizes the relevant events discussed so far. 
 
Figure 3 Timeline of relevant events  
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3 Climate change politics in the United States 
 
In this section I discuss relevant US climate change politics. However, it is not in the 
scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive history of climate politics in the US. I 
will only discuss issues most relevant to the focus of this study. I begin by outlining the 
general divide between Democrats and Republicans on climate change. This is followed 
by a description of other relevant climate policies of the Obama administration (in 
addition to the PA already discussed in section 2), and Republicans’ response to them.  
 
3.1 The divide between Democrats and Republicans 
 
A partisan divide between the two main political parties in the US, Democrats and 
Republicans (Grand Old Party, GOP), on climate change politics began to grow 
significantly during Ronald Reagan’s presidency (GOP) in the 1980s. His administration 
attempted to undermine environmental issues, because these were considered an obstacle 
for economic growth. The partisan divide continued to grow over the 1990s and during 
George W. Bush’s presidency (GOP) (Dunlap and McCright 2008, 26). Republicans have 
tended to object proposed policies for reducing emissions, for example the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997. They have also questioned the overall existence of climate change – 
and especially humans’ role in causing it.  
 
Democrats, on the other hand, have usually believed more in climate change and humans’ 
part in causing it, and thus provided support for related policies (Brewer 2012, 8-9). A 
break in the polarisation came with the 2008 presidential elections, when both candidates, 
John McCain (GOP) and Barack Obama (Democrat), expressed their support for climate 
change policies. After the election and Obama’s victory, the polarisation returned 
(Brewer 2012, 9-10). Obama’s climate policy efforts during his time in office from 2009 
to 2017 are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
According to studies, there is a difference in stances towards global warming between the 
two major parties. A study by National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE 
2018) found that the divide between the two parties is high. Most of the Democrats 
believe in global warming and that humans have played a role in causing it, while much 
less Republicans hold the same view. Based on Gallup Organization’s poll of 2016, 
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Dunlap, McCright and Yarosh (2016, 8-9) found almost matching results for 
corresponding questions with Republicans being more sceptical of human-caused global 
warming. The results of both studies are summarized in tables 1 and 2 below.  
 
% of the self-identified There is solid 
evidence of global 
warming. 
Humans are at least partially 
responsible for warming on the 
planet. 
Democrats 90% 78% 
Republicans 50% 35% 
Table 1 Stances of self-identified Democrats and Republicans on global warming (NSEE 
2018) 
 
% of the self-identified The effects of global 
warming have already 
begun. 
Human actions have 
played a role in global 
warming. 
Democrats 75 % 84 % 
Republicans 41% 43 % 
Table 2 Stances of self-identified Democrats and Republicans on global warming 
(Dunlap, McCright and Yarosh 2016) 
 
However, the divide may not be as black and white as it appears. Van Boven, Ehret and 
Sherman (2018, 494-495) note in their study that even though in general Democrats 
believe more in climate change, the scepticism of Republicans is often exaggerated, and 
the partisan divide is not as great as it may seem. According to their study, there was an 
overall belief in climate change among all the respondents. Even though a partisan divide 
was visible, most of both party identifiers, Republicans and Democrats, did believe in 
climate change. Results are presented in table 3. Due to space limits and because they are 
not considered relevant, the results do not include the categorization of those who do not 
identify with neither Democrats nor Republicans (Independents). 
 
Categorical climate change belief (2014/2016) 
 Believers Sceptics Undecided 
% of Democrats 93% / 89% 5% / 4% 2% / 7% 
% of Republicans 70% / 63% 26% / 25% 4% / 12% 
Table 3 Climate change belief among Democrats and Republicans (Van Boven, Ehret 
and Sherman 2018) 
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Media tends to highlight the polarisation between the parties, which could cause the 
exaggeration of Republican scepticism. For example, instead of reporting the percentage 
of sceptics among Republicans (27% and 25%), media might focus more on the portion 
of Republicans among climate sceptics. Based on the surveys, Van Boven, Ehret and 
Sherman (2018, 495) categorized 15 % of all respondents in 2014 and 14 % in 2016 as 
climate sceptics. Out of these, in 2016, Republicans represented 71 % while Democrats 
only 15 %. As can be seen, here the divide between the two parties is greater than in the 
first results about who believes in climate change. 
 
Van Boven, Ehret and Sherman argue that the differences in climate change politics 
mostly stem from “tendency to place party over policy” (2018, 497). In other words, even 
though most Democrats and Republicans appear to personally believe that climate change 
is real, political partisanship affects the public stances they take. The two parties compete 
with each other and are sceptical of the opponent’s proposed policies. Van Boven, Ehret 
and Sherman argue that Republicans oppose climate policies, because they are often 
thought specifically as Democratic policies, and not necessarily because they would 
genuinely think that climate change is a not real (ibid.). 
 
This climate policy rivalry between the Democrats and Republicans is also visible in their 
latest party platforms. A party platform is a document, in which a party states the policies 
it is promoting in order to win an election. A party platform usually includes the main 
principles, objectives and strategies of the party. It reflects the policies the candidates of 
the party promote and aim to execute when in office.  
 
In the Democratic party platform of 2016, there is a separate section for climate change 
with the following statement: “Democrats share a deep commitment to tackling the 
climate challenge….reducing greenhouse gas emissions more than 80 percent below 2005 
levels by 2050; and meeting the pledge President Obama put forward in the landmark 
Paris Agreement…” (Democratic Party Platform 2016, 24). In the 2016 Republican 
platform (2016), on the other hand, climate change is mentioned only when Democratic 
policies are mentioned and the (then) current administration’s actions, including decisions 
to join international agreements without the consent of the Senate, are attacked. “All 
international executive agreements and political arrangements entered into by the current 
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Administration must be deemed null and void as mere expressions of the current 
president’s preferences” (Republican Party Platform 2016, 26). 
 
3.2 Climate policies in the United States since 2009 
 
In this section I provide a brief overview of climate policies in the US since 2009, the 
beginning of Obama's term in office. As was mentioned in the previous section, during 
his campaign Obama promised to push climate action forward. During the years in office 
(2009-2017), Obama administration did issue multiple climate change related policies. 
Already during the presidential campaign, a New Energy for America plan was released. 
The plan’s aim was to reduce GHG emissions, increase clean and renewable energy use, 
decrease the country’s need of foreign oil and create new jobs. In order to cut emissions, 
an emissions trading system was proposed (Obama for America 2008). Ultimately 
however, the bill aimed to establish the system3 did not pass the US Congress. House of 
Representatives approved it in 2009, but it was never taken up by the Senate to vote 
(Pianin 2014). US Congress at the time had Democrat majority, however, according to 
Pianin (2014), opposers to the bill (including Republicans and the coal industry) “attacked 
Democrats who supported it, warning the legislation would raise energy prices and cost 
jobs”. 
 
In 2015 a major climate policy, the Clean Power Plan (CPP), was announced by Obama 
together with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The main aim of the CPP was to 
cut CO2 emissions from (especially coal-burning) power plants by 32 % below 2005 
levels by 2030. The plan set customized emissions reduction targets for each state (EPA 
2018). The legality of the CPP was based on the Clean Air Act (CAA)4. In 2007, the case 
of Massachusetts v. EPA concluded that “EPA has the authority under the CAA to 
regulate GHGs as air pollutants” (Kienast 2015, 316). Since this decision, Obama 
administration issued many climate policies through EPA. These include for example the 
above mentioned CPP and different vehicle emissions standards (Kemp 2017a, 89). In 
addition, during his presidency Obama administration did not grant permission to 
Keystone XL, a planned oil pipeline between Canada and the US, and building of Dakota 
Access, another oil pipeline, was delayed by the administration.  
                                                 
3 H.R.2454 - American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (US Congress 2009) 
4 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 USC. §7401 et seq. (1970) (EPA 2017) 
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Trump administration, on the other hand, does not consider climate change policies a 
priority, but rather a hindrance burdening the US economy and domestic jobs (Pavone 
2018, 35). According to Zhang et al. (2017, 221), one of the main reasons behind the 
withdrawal decision in June 2017 was related to Trump administration’s domestic 
politics. The administration (and GOP) has close ties to several US fossil fuel companies, 
producers of CO2 emissions, and previous climate regulations had already been revoked 
in favour of the industry. Only couple of days after his inaugural, in January 2017, Trump 
approved both Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. Kemp (2017b, 3) estimates 
that the pipelines could each potentially cause additional annual emissions of over 100 
MtCO2. Furthermore, in March 2017 Trump issued an executive order
5  targeted to 
rollback many of the Obama era domestic climate policies and to uplift especially the 
coal industry. The order included a review and possible repeal of the CPP. A replacement 
to CPP, the Affordable Clean Energy Rule was issued in August 2018 (EPA 2018). The 
replacement rule would weaken the rules for coal-burning power plants. During 2018, 
EPA issued also other rollback measures, such as “weakened methane emissions 
standards for oil and gas facilities” and “proposed freezing emissions standards for light 
duty vehicles after 2020” (Climate Action Tracker 2018). It could then be said that 
withdrawing from the PA was just another step in this line of revoking and modifying 
existing climate regulations.  
 
Based on this and the previous section, it can be concluded that the climate policies of 
both presidents are in line with the general stance of their respective political parties. 
Following the general Democratic view, Obama aimed to shift US climate policies to 
better tackle climate change. According to Pavone (2018, 39), Trump’s climate policy is 
also continuing in the footsteps of previous Republicans administrations, despite the 
“aggressive rhetoric” used to convey the messages. The analysis and discussion section 
later in this thesis will demonstrate how these stances are legitimated in the presidential 
statements. This concludes the discussion on climate change related politics in the US.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth (Trump 2017b) 
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4 Theoretical background  
 
 
This section provides an overview of the concept of legitimation and discusses 
specifically legitimation in political discourse. For the purpose of this thesis, political 
discourse here is simply defined as the language used within the domain of politics. After 
discussing legitimation in general, I will present Van Leeuwen’s strategies of 
legitimation, which are used as the main framework of the study. In addition, I introduce 
Reyes's legitimation strategies to complement Van Leeuwen’s work on discursive 
legitimation. Lastly, I will also address some criticism on Van Leeuwen’s framework and 
present earlier studies employing legitimation strategies. 
 
4.1 Overview of legitimation 
 
Legitimation6 has been a central concept in social sciences, from sociology to political 
theory (see Weber 1964; Habermas 1976 and Beetham 1991). Legitimation is usually 
connected with the concept of power, and this connection is necessary to briefly explain 
here, even though the present study does not focus on power as such. I follow Foucault’s 
idea (1978, 93-95) of power being everywhere and exercised in the interaction of different 
relations: from one position to another. These relations are not equal, some allow the 
exercise of power over others, while others do not. Where there is power, there is also 
resistance, exercised by those subjected to the power. Legitimation, then, is about 
“making sense of power” (Luckmann 1987, 111). Legitimation functions to justify the 
exercise of power, and some legitimations can be based on positions of power. 
 
For Berger and Luckmann ([1966] 1987), legitimation is a process by which people 
explain and justify different practices within the social order. This definition stems from 
their view of reality being socially constructed by people – especially through language. 
In this thesis I follow Berger and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1987, 82) view of legitimation 
resting on language, and language being the main means of expressing legitimation.  
 
                                                 
6 For the sake of clarification, throughout this thesis the spellings legitimation and to 
legitimate are used. However, e.g. Reyes (2011) uses the spellings legitimization and to 
legitimize in his work. 
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Following in the footsteps of Berger and Luckmann, Reyes defines legitimation as the 
process by which social actors justify behaviour “by providing arguments that explain 
our social actions, ideas, thoughts, declarations etc.” (2011, 782). This definition is well 
exemplified by Van Leeuwen (2007, 93), who states that legitimation aims to answer the 
following questions: Why should we do this? and Why should we do this in this way? 
Moreover, Reyes holds that legitimation involves reaching a goal, which often means 
seeking support or approval for the action in order to, for instance, gain a position of 
power, social acceptance or popularity (2011, 782). Hence, in legitimation social actors 
justify why a certain action should be made or was already made. The actors try to back 
these justifications with arguments in favour of the action in order to convince the 
audience to accept it.  
 
As stated above, this thesis follows the view that legitimation is mainly expressed through 
language. However, Van Leeuwen (2007, 107) points out that even though legitimation 
and language are intertwined, legitimation can sometimes be realized also visually or 
musically (i.e. multimodal legitimation), for example through movies, photographs or 
visual symbols. Multimodal legitimation has been studied for instance by Mackay (2015). 
He formulates a six-layer framework for multimodal legitimation that he exemplifies by 
analysing a video by the Scottish National Party, through which it attempts to affect the 
Scottish referendum on independence. While in the present study multimodal legitimation 
is not taken into account, it is worth noting that in some occasions legitimation also occurs 
outside the text itself. Here the focus is only on the language of the presidential statement 
transcripts. There are two reasons for this choice. First one is a practical issue, since 
despite thorough search I was not able to find complete video recordings of all the 
statements. Thus, the visual aspects of all of them cannot be considered. Secondly, due 
to limited space I decided to focus only on the transcript. The statements were voiced in 
rather plain situations and I do not consider that examining multimodal legitimation 
would bring considerable additional value to the analysis of the transcript texts. The 
presidential statements are discussed more in section 5.1. 
 
Studying the language different actors use will help to reveal what legitimation strategies 
are at play. Fairclough (2003, 88) argues that discourse analysis is “a significant resource 
for researching legitimation”, because social actors continually seek legitimation for their 
actions in the text or talk they produce. Sometimes legitimation can be rather explicitly 
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conveyed, but it may also be more implicitly expressed in different discourses (Fairclough 
2003, 219). Furthermore, as Van Dijk (1998, 255) explains it, legitimation is usually not 
clearly visible in one simple utterance, but rather it is “a complex, ongoing discursive 
practice involving a set of interrelated discourses.” Thus, when studying discursive 
legitimation, it is not enough to analyse only the level of a clause, but the analysis needs 
to be conducted on a broader spectrum in order to unfold the strategies used by the social 
actors.  
 
Is legitimation then different than or the same as justification? Fairclough and Fairclough 
(2012, 109) think that the two concepts have been mistakenly regarded as having 
somewhat the same meaning. Rather, they view legitimation only as a form of 
justification. For Fairclough and Fairclough legitimation is “an argumentative process in 
which an action is justified in terms of reasons which can themselves, in turn, be justified 
as (worthy of being) collectively accepted or recognized” (2012, 242). In other words, for 
them legitimation is a public justification, which gains its legitimating power from shared 
institutional beliefs, values and norms. According to Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, 
109) justifications of actions that are not publicly shared or publicly justified cannot be 
called legitimations. They exemplify the difference with two examples: 
 
(1) MPs shouldn’t fiddle their expenses because they are breaking the law. 
(2) MPs shouldn’t fiddle their expenses because they could end up in prison. 
 
Fairclough and Fairclough argue that example 1 is a legitimating justification, since it 
appeals to law, which can be publicly justified, while example 2 is not a legitimation, 
because it only refers to the personal interests of the MPs: fiddling would not be in their 
interests, since they might end up in prison (for breaking the law, which is left unsaid) 
(2012, 109). I consider both examples as justifications but concur with Fairclough and 
Fairclough in that for me example 1 is more a legitimation than example 2, since it refers 
to something shared (the law) instead of something more personal. 
 
The above observation leads us to an important notion in this thesis: even though 
legitimation is mainly expressed discursively, it is context-dependent. Legitimation 
depends on the shared knowledge, beliefs and moral values between the social actors 
involved in a specific context. This notion is related to Rojo and Van Dijk’s (1997) 
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discussion of the macro and micro dimensions of legitimation. Rojo and Van Dijk 
differentiate between three levels of legitimation, of which the first two, pragmatic and 
semantic, are discursive (micro) and the third one is socio-political (macro). The three 
levels of legitimation by Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) are: 
 
1. Pragmatic: the different strategies of justification of the action that needs to be 
legitimated (what was done was justified in terms of these norms or laws) 
2. Semantic: the subjective representation of the action and issues related to it as 
‘true’ (our representation is the correct one and opponents’ one is false) 
3. Socio-political: the way the discourse is authoritative through self-legitimation 
while delegitimating alternative discourse (our discourse is legitimate and 
credible because of our power or authority position)  
 
According to Rojo and Van Dijk, there is constant interaction between the macro and 
micro dimensions, and when analysing legitimation both need to be considered in order 
to produce respectable results. Thus, although legitimation is almost always manifested 
discursively, it is also a socio-political act (Rojo and Van Dijk 1997, 527-528). The third 
level, socio-political, also relates to the previously discussed issue of power, and how 
some legitimations can be based on positions of power. 
 
While legitimating one’s own actions and representations, these three levels also 
contribute to the delegitimation of the opposition. What then is delegitimation? Following 
Chilton’s (2004, 47) definition, I consider legitimation and delegitimation as being on the 
opposite ends of a line. While the former involves representing the (own) action that 
needs to be legitimated as positive and beneficial, the latter, on the other hand, involves 
depicting the opposition as negative and unacceptable in order to highlight the own 
actions.  
 
Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) examine Spanish parliamentary speech to see how the speaker 
legitimates the expulsion of immigrants, which was criticised as a violation of human 
rights by the opposition. They demonstrate how discursive legitimation is crucial in 
gaining support for policies that are seen as illegitimate by the opposing group and also 
in suppressing the voices of the critics (i.e. delegitimating). In this process of legitimation, 
all three levels (pragmatic, semantic and socio-political) are at play.  
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According to Chilton (2004, 47) legitimation can be expressed as “self-praise, self-
apology, self-explanation, self-justification, self-identification as a source of authority, 
reason, vision and sanity”. The self can refer to the social actor doing the legitimation or 
the group the actor identifies with. Instead of the self, delegitimation targets the other, 
which refer to those outside the self-group. Delegitimation can be manifested as “negative 
other-presentation, acts of blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding, attacking 
the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative 
cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other” (ibid.). This 
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation often results in an Us/Them 
polarization, in which our group’s actions are highlighted as good and the other group’s 
actions as bad (see Van Dijk 1998 for more discussion). Oddo has studied presidential 
speeches justifying war. He found that the US/Them polarization was one of the key 
legitimation strategies and it was used in connection with other strategies (2011, 289). I 
will present different strategies of legitimation after first discussing legitimation in 
political discourse. 
 
4.2 Legitimation in political discourse  
 
According to Chilton (2004, 8), (de)legitimating is an essential function in political 
discourse. Political actors, such as presidents, constantly have to give justifications and 
reasons for the specific actions and decisions they take in order to convince the audience 
(Chilton 2004, 23). In other words, political actors aim to gain the support of their 
audience (be it the public or the parliament) by providing justifications for the actions 
they take. However, if we follow the line of thought of Fairclough and Fairclough (see 
previous section), these justifications also need to include some kind of publicly shared 
or justified belief, value or norm in order to serve as legitimations. 
 
Rojo and Van Dijk (1997, 528) also see political legitimation as being tied to the shared 
norms and beliefs. The dominant group or institution (which in this study is the president 
and his administration) attempts to gain normative approval for its actions by applying 
strategies that try to demonstrate how these actions are in line with “the moral order of 
society, that is, within the system of laws, norms, agreements or aims agreed upon by (the 
majority of) the citizens” (ibid.). Thus, for Rojo and Van Dijk, legitimation is highly 
connected to the moral, social and political dimensions of the actions that are being 
 23 
justified. Rojo and Van Dijk continue to argue that those institutional actions for which 
legitimation is wanted are usually depicted as beneficial for all, while opposing actions 
may be disregarded or concealed (i.e. delegitimation, see previous section) (ibid.). 
 
The act of legitimation is especially relevant when political actions and decisions are 
considered controversial. This often includes opponents’ critique and accusations which 
then need to be answered (Rojo and Van Dijk (1997, 528). Republicans, the main 
opponent party to Democrats, criticised the PA on many occasions before and after the 
COP21 (Cama 2015 and 2016). This meant that Obama had to defend and justify his 
actions, to legitimate his administration’s decision to adopt and sign the treaty. Trump, 
on the other hand, also had to legitimate his administration’s decision to leave the 
agreement, because it too faced a lot of criticism before the official withdrawal 
announcement (Henry 2017a and 2017b).  
 
Rojo and Van Dijk (1997, 528) also point out that legitimation has a top-down and a 
bottom-up function. Top-down means that the dominant political actor, which, in the case 
of this thesis is the US president and his administration, seeks legitimation from the 
dominated, in this case either the international community or the nation. The audiences 
of the statements are discussed later in section 5.1. Bottom-up aspect, on the other hand, 
means that the audience (the dominated) legitimates the dominant actor by giving and 
showing its acceptance or compliance somehow. Due to limited space, in this study I only 
focus on the top-down direction of legitimation analysing how the two presidents use 
different legitimation strategies to justify their decisions. Thus, I will not study whether 
the audience legitimates the presidents by agreement or acceptance. 
 
In these two sections I have discussed legitimation (and delegitimation), and specifically 
legitimation in political discourse. Next, Van Leeuwen’s strategies of legitimation are 
presented, since they provide the main theoretical basis of the present study. After these, 
I will also introduce legitimation strategies identified by Reyes (2011) in order to get a 
more comprehensive framework of discursive legitimation. When presenting the 
strategies, I use examples from Van Leeuwen and Reyes to exemplify how the 
legitimation functions. As one of the aims of this thesis is also to test how well my data 
works with the typology of legitimation strategies, the results will be more transparent 
and easier to see when comparing my examples to Van Leeuwen’s and Reyes’s.  
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4.3 Van Leeuwen’s strategies of legitimation 
 
Van Leeuwen provides a framework for analysing the discursive construction of 
legitimation for social practices (2007 and 2008). Social practice Van Leeuwen defines 
as “socially regulated ways of doing things” (2008, 6). A social practice could be for 
example a lecture at university, the act of baking cookies or the act of adopting an 
international agreement or withdrawing from such. For Van Leeuwen, text and talk then 
produce the representations of social practices. He emphasizes the difference between 
“doing it” (the social practice) and “talking about it” (representations of the social 
practices) (ibid.). Through these representations it is possible to evaluate, discuss and 
importantly for this thesis, legitimate, the social practices. For further discussion on social 
practice see Van Leeuwen (2008). 
 
Van Leeuwen applies legitimation theory to a corpus of various texts that all relate to the 
social practice of the first day at school (2007 and 2008). Based on this corpus, Van 
Leeuwen (2007, 92) identifies four different strategies of legitimation, which are 
presented in table 4. 
 
 
Authorization 
Legitimation rests on some kind of 
authority (institutional or a person). 
 
 
Moral Evaluation 
Legitimation by reference to some kind of 
moral values. 
 
Rationalization 
Legitimation by reference to reason and 
knowledge; goals, effects and use 
worthiness. 
 
 
Mythopoesis 
Legitimation is built through narratives in 
which legitimate actions are rewarded and 
non-legitimate ones are punished. 
Table 4 Van Leeuwen’s (2007 and 2008) strategies of legitimation 
 
Each strategy has additional subcategories. Multiple strategies can be in place at the same 
time or they can appear independently (Van Leeuwen 2007, 92). Next, I will introduce 
the categories and their subcategories one by one.  
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4.3.1 Authorization 
 
In authorization, legitimation (or delegitimation) is accomplished by referring to some 
kind of authority (e.g. tradition, custom or law) or to someone in whom authority is vested 
(Van Leeuwen 2007, 92). Van Leeuwen differentiates six subcategories of authorization: 
personal, expert, role model and impersonal authority as well as authority of tradition and 
authority of conformity. 
 
Personal authority means that a legitimate person has authority because of “their status 
or role in a particular institution”. Due to their status, it is enough for these authorities to 
justify their decisions or actions by a mere “because I say so” (Van Leeuwen 2007, 94). 
An example of personal authority in the case of Van Leeuwen’s corpus would be parents 
and teachers. In the case of this thesis, then, an appropriate example would be the 
president of a country. This relates to the connection between power and legitimation (see 
section 4.1): a president is in a position of power and has the necessary authority to 
exercise power over others. Thus, analysing presidential statements is especially 
important. Though, authority is only one aspect of the legitimation and that’s why I 
examine other aspects as well. 
 
According to Van Leeuwen (ibid.), personal authority is usually realized by a verbal 
process (following the terminology in Halliday 1985) and some kind of obligation 
modality in the authority’s utterance. Van Leeuwen’s example (2007, 94): 
 
(3) Magnus sat down. Because the teacher said they had to. 
 
Closely related to personal authority is the category of expert authority. Here, instead of 
status or role, legitimacy comes from expertise. This type of authority can be explicitly 
stated or taken for granted in the case of well-known experts (Van Leeuwen 2007, 94-
95). Linguistically, expert authority can also be realized by verbal processes but also by 
mental processes with the expert in subject position. An example (Van Leeuwen 2007, 
95): 
 
(4) Dr Juan believes it may be a good idea to spend some time with the child in class. 
 
 26 
A third category of authority vested in a person is role model authority, in which people 
follow the actions and beliefs of, for example, media personalities or peer group members 
who serve as role models. The behaviours and attitudes these role models adopt are 
enough to legitimate their followers’ actions. In Van Leeuwen’s example the authority 
stems from a peer group member the wise teacher (Van Leeuwen 2007, 95): 
 
(5) The wise teacher finds out the correct way to pronounce the child’s name. 
 
According to Van Leeuwen (2007, 95-96), role model authority is also very important in 
advertising and lifestyle media. Nowadays this is prominent for example in social media 
platforms such as Instagram, where media celebrities advertise different products or 
services. Their followers then may look up to these when making consumer choices. This 
kind of authority may also be accomplished visually making it multimodal legitimation 
(see section 4.1). 
 
In addition to authority relating to persons, Van Leeuwen (2007, 96) identifies impersonal 
authority. Here legitimation is accomplished by reference to laws, rules, policies and 
regulations. These impersonal forms can, as personal ones, be manifested in discourse as 
verbal processes as in “because the law says so” or “the rules state that”. However, Van 
Leeuwen (ibid.) points out that it is essential that nouns like policy, regulation, rule and 
law or their cognate adjectives and adverbs like compulsory and mandatory are present 
in the clauses. An example from Van Leeuwen’s corpus (ibid.): 
 
(6) It is the policy in her area to admit children termly after their fifth birthday. 
 
In authority of tradition, as the name implies, authority relates to tradition and customs. 
Answers to the why-question would be “because this is what we always do” or “because 
this is what we have always done” and key nouns are tradition, practice, custom and habit 
(Van Leeuwen 2007 96). The supposition then is that these references in themselves are 
enough to justify the claim. Van Leeuwen’s example (ibid.): 
 
(7) It was the practice for children in infant schools to be given free milk daily. 
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Authority of conformity, then, means that if everyone else is doing something, you should 
also do it: “because that’s what everybody else does” or “because that’s what most people 
do”. Linguistically, authority of conformity can be realized for example through an 
explicit comparison or high frequency modality (Van Leeuwen 2007, 96-97). In example 
8 (Van Leeuwen 2007, 97), the authority is realized with frequency modality: 
 
(8) Many schools now adopt this practice.  
 
4.3.2 Moral evaluation 
 
The second strategy of legitimation is moral evaluation, in which (de)legitimation stems 
from various moral values. Moral evaluations may not be as explicitly identified in a 
given discourse as authorization. Van Leeuwen explains how sometimes moral values are 
realized by simple words such as good or bad, but mostly moral evaluations cannot be 
identified so easily. Usually moral evaluations are part of a larger “specific discourse of 
moral value”, which is culturally dependent. This means that mere linguistic methods are 
not enough to analyse moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen 2007, 97). For example, what is 
considered normal or healthy in one culture may not be the same in another. These moral 
values are usually only hinted at in the discourse and thus the researcher needs to take 
also the social, cultural and political context into consideration (Van Leeuwen 2007, 98).  
 
Van Leeuwen lists three subcategories of moral evaluation: evaluation, abstraction and 
analogies. Evaluation involves evaluative adjectives, which can both describe concrete 
qualities and refer to moral or cultural aspects of the action or object in question. In the 
latter case, the moral evaluation is implicit and more difficult to identify (Van Leeuwen 
2007, 98). For example, the adjective green can denote both the concrete colour of green 
or green (ecological) values. Naturalization, a form of evaluation, means that an action 
or object is represented as normal or natural in order to legitimate it. In addition to 
concrete adjectives (example 9), naturalization can be realized “by reference to time or to 
the concept of change” (example 10) (Van Leeuwen 2007, 98-99). Naturalization can be 
difficult to identify, because it blurs the lines between the real natural order and the moral 
and cultural one in a disguise. In example 10 naturalization works without an explicit 
reference to something being natural or normal, and thus it is not possible to pin it down 
to a specific word or phrase. Van Leeuwen (2007, 99) suggests that if human intervention 
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can alter something, then it usually is of moral or cultural character, and if not, then we 
are dealing with real natural order. 
 
(9) It is only natural that the first days of school are upsetting. 
(10) Soon autumn would be here and Mark and Mandy would have to start school. 
 
The second subcategory of moral evaluation is abstraction. Here, instead of describing 
the phenomenon under legitimation straight as it is, it is expressed in an abstract and 
moralized way. The examples 11 and 12 (Van Leeuwen 2007, 99) clarify this. Example 
11 contains an explicit statement, while example 12 expresses the same thing more 
abstractly. 
 
(11) The child goes to school for the first time.  
(12) The child takes up independence. 
 
The final way to realize moral evaluation is through analogies (comparisons). One 
practice is compared to another in order to legitimate it – either positively or negatively. 
This means that something is legitimate, because it is similar to another practice, or it is 
legitimate, because it is different than the other practice. The previously discussed 
Us/Them polarization applies also here. Comparisons can be explicit (through similarity 
conjunction or circumstances of comparisons), implicit or narrativized, and they can be 
placed within one clause or a longer piece of discourse (Van Leeuwen 2007, 99-100). 
Example of an explicit analogy (Van Leeuwen 2007, 100): 
 
(13) It will become as automatic as cleaning your teeth. 
 
4.3.3 Rationalization 
 
While moral evaluation refers more to emotions, the third legitimation strategy, 
rationalization, refers to reason. Van Leeuwen (2007, 101) separates two types of 
rationalization: instrumental and theoretical rationality. 
 
In the first one, instrumental rationality, (de)legitimation is accomplished by reference to 
the goals, uses and effects of the social action in question. Here it is important to clarify 
the difference between legitimation and purpose. According to Van Leeuwen, instead of 
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answering the question why like legitimation, purpose provides an answer to what for 
(2008, 20). For a purpose to become an instance of legitimation, it has to have some kind 
of a moral component: an action is legitimation if it is a moralized action and not only a 
generalized one. Van Leeuwen (2007, 102) uses the following examples to mark the 
difference:  
 
(14) His mother joins the queue to pay his dinner money to the teacher. 
(15) The following strategies were employed to make the introduction to PE more 
smooth.  
 
Example 14 is purpose, since it does not include any morality. In example 15, on the other 
hand, the word smooth gives a moral evaluation of the introduction to PE making it 
legitimation. In conclusion, rationalization does not act as legitimation without any moral 
component albeit morality being implicit (Van Leeuwen 2007, 100).  
 
Instrumental rationality can be further divided into three subtypes: goal-orientation, 
means-orientation and effect orientation. In goal-orientation an action is legitimated by 
referring to the motives, aims or goals that are wanted to acquire through the action. Thus, 
goal-orientation is often expressed with a to-phrase. However, it can also be implicit, 
without the to-phrase (Van Leeuwen (2007, 102). While goal-orientation is about the 
motive or goal of the action, means-orientation focuses more on how this target is 
accomplished. Expressions such as by, by means of and through often denote means-
oriented rationality. Though, as the previous subtype, also means-orientation can be 
realized more implicitly (Van Leeuwen 2007, 102-103). The third subtype of instrumental 
rationality is effect orientation, which is about the effect and outcome of the action often 
expressed with so that and that way -phrases. According the Van Leeuwen (2007, 103) 
this differs from the similar goal-orientation in that “the purpose is outcome of an action” 
not the goal in itself. 
 
Van Leeuwen (2007, 103) clarifies the difference between the three subtypes with 
examples describing a similar issue. Example 16 is goal-orientation, example 17 is 
means-orientation and example 18 is effect-orientation. 
 
(16) Your child has to learn to control aggressiveness, so as to be accepted by others. 
(17) Your child will be accepted by others by learning to control aggressiveness. 
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(18) Your child has to learn to control aggressiveness, so others accept him. 
 
In addition to instrumental rationality, Van Leeuwen identifies a second type of 
rationalization: theoretical rationality. Here, practices are (de)legitimated by appealing 
to the natural order of things (Van Leeuwen 2007, 101), not by appealing to their 
usefulness or effectiveness as in instrumental rationality. Theoretical rationality appears 
similar to naturalization, but it is done more explicitly, by giving descriptions on “the way 
things are” (Van Leeuwen 2007, 104). Again, Van Leeuwen differentiates between three 
subtypes, which are definition, explanation and prediction. 
 
The first, definition, means that an action is defined by linking it to another action, which 
is presented as good or bad (i.e. moralized) in order to legitimate it. This connection is 
established either with an attributive (e.g. is, constitutes) or a significative (e.g. means, 
signals) as in example 19 (Van Leeuwen 2007, 104). Here the act of going to school is 
defined in relation to the process of growing up. 
 
(19) School signals that her children are growing up. 
 
Explanation, on the other hand, does not describe the action, but instead the actors 
involved in that action. According to Van Leeuwen, “explanations describe general 
attributes or habitual activities of the categories of actors in question” and answer the why 
question with “because doing things this way is appropriate to the nature of these actors” 
(Van Leeuwen 2007, 104). Van Leeuwen found from his corpus that “parents use the 
same way to school each day because small children thrive on routine” (ibid.). Here the 
children are the actors who are being described and the action under legitimation is using 
the same way to school each day. 
 
The final subtype of theoretical rationality is prediction, which are based on some kind 
of expertise and prior knowledge, but not in the same way as expert authority. Van 
Leeuwen’s example (ibid.) is based on a mother’s experience on children crying:  
 
(20) Don’t worry if you or your child cries. It won’t last long. 
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4.3.4 Mythopoesis 
 
Van Leeuwen’s final strategy of legitimation is mythopoesis (making of myths). 
Legitimation is accomplished through storytelling and narratives. Van Leeuwen (2007, 
105-106) differentiates two types of mythopoesis. Moral tales are narratives in which 
legitimate actions and efforts to restore the legitimate order are rewarded. They have a 
happy ending. On contrary to this, cautionary tales describe what happens if the norms 
of social practices are not followed. Illegitimate actions are punished, and the narratives 
have unhappy endings. They include a warning: “this is what happens if…”  Some 
narratives might present their moral lesson quite explicitly, while others include inversion 
(e.g. of semantic features) or symbolic actions, which represent more than one social 
practice (Van Leeuwen 2007, 106). Legitimation by storytelling can also be accomplished 
visually through movies, games or comics (Van Leeuwen 2007, 107).  
 
I have now presented Van Leeuwen’s four strategies of legitimation: authorization, moral 
evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. In order to complete Van Leeuwen’s 
typology, in the following section I will present strategies identified by Reyes (2011). 
 
4.4 Reyes’s strategies of legitimation 
 
In his study on legitimation in political discourse, Reyes (2011) examines US presidential 
speeches in which armed conflicts and war are justified. He develops Van Leeuwen’s 
typology further and formulates five different legitimation strategies used in the speeches. 
I will shortly describe each strategy identified by Reyes to provide an overview of his 
work.  
 
Reyes’s material (presidential discourse) is similar to this study, and I consider some of 
his strategies as useful additions to the ones by Van Leeuwen. However, I will not include 
all five strategies by Reyes to my typology of legitimation strategies, as some of these are 
not useful for my analysis. They fall within other categories by Van Leeuwen, and hence 
it is not necessary to employ them separately in the analysis. The strategies identified by 
Reyes (2011) are: 
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1. Legitimation through emotions 
2. Legitimation through a hypothetical future 
3. Legitimation through rationality  
4. Voices of expertise 
5. Altruism 
 
In the first strategy, legitimation through emotions, the political actor aims to generate 
different emotions, such as fear, sadness or insecurity, in the audience in order to gain 
support for certain proposals and actions. Appealing to emotions (through e.g. collective 
memory or shared belief) may help the political actor to influence and change the 
audience’s perception of these actions (Reyes 2011, 789). In Reyes’s words: “emotions 
skew the audience towards accepting and supporting the proposal of the social actor, who 
has triggered the emotions in the first place” (2011, 790). This strategy often includes 
Us/Them polarization, in which the speaker (and possibly the audience) belong to the we-
group that is represented positively while others, part of the they-group, are represented 
negatively (Reyes 2011, 785). In his study, Reyes (2011, 790-791) focuses especially on 
fear, which is often realized in political discourse by “demonization of the enemy” (i.e. 
the they-group) for example through the negative representation of social actors (e.g. by 
negative moral attributes, nouns and verbs). In example 21 (Reyes 2011, 791), the 
negative connotation noun killers is used to create fear in the audience: 
 
(21) They’re tired of foreigners and killers in their midst. 
 
In the analysis of this study, I will not specifically try to examine legitimation through 
emotions, since I consider it embedded with the other legitimation strategies. When 
relevant, I will point to a case of legitimation through emotions in the examples provided 
from the data. 
 
According to Reyes (2011, 793), legitimation often involves a sort of timeline that links 
the past, the present and the future together. His second strategy is legitimation through 
a hypothetical future, which often involves describing a threat in the future as requiring 
imminent action in the present. By focusing on the possible future, the political actor can 
turn the attention and pressure away from the present moment, which may include 
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controversial issues (Reyes 2011, 794). There are two alternatives that can be represented 
by the social actor. The first one describes, what will happen in the future, “if we do not 
do what the speaker proposes in the present”. The second alternative is to describe the 
contrary scenario: what will happen “if we do act according to the speaker’s suggestion” 
(Reyes 2011, 793). The following two examples demonstrate how the strategy can be 
linguistically realized (Reyes 2011, 794): 
 
(22) If we were to fail in Iraq, the enemy would follow us here to America. 
(23) It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks 
are being plotted as I speak. 
 
Epistemic modality, which denotes the degree of certainty of the statement in question 
(Chilton 2004, 59), is an essential part of this strategy. Example 22 includes a clear 
conditional structure (if and the modal verb would), while example 23 does not include 
any modal verbs, which increases the degree of certainty and makes the statement seem 
more like a fact than a condition and hence (Reyes 2011, 795-796). In order to work well, 
legitimation through a hypothetical future too is reliant on the collective memory and 
shared beliefs of the group. The two examples above would not be efficient legitimations 
if the audience did not share the memory of 9/11 and the Iraq war. 
 
(24) We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four 
airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. 
 
For Reyes (2011, 786), his third strategy, legitimation through rationality, corresponds 
somewhat to Van Leeuwen’s theoretical rationalization; legitimation by reference to the 
natural order of things. Example 24 (Reyes 2011, 798) demonstrates a rational construct, 
in which the US war on terror is justified because “a party is allowed to respond to and 
maintain or perpetuate a violent act if the party did not start the fight” (ibid.). The first 
sentence of example 24 depicts this and builds the legitimation. Reyes (2011, 797) views 
legitimation through rationality as accomplished by representing decision-making as a 
careful and evaluative assessment process with the end product (decision) being the 
rational choice. He continues to emphasize that rationality is culturally bound, something 
is considered rational and the right way or thing to do in a given society. Reyes also 
mentions, like Van Leeuwen, that rationality is often based on some morality (2011, 798). 
In the present study, I place this category by Reyes under Van Leeuwen’s rationalization, 
since the two are not so different that it would be necessary to analyse them separate.  
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(25) Our new commander in Afghanistan – General McChrystal – has reported that the 
security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: the status quo is 
not sustainable.  
 
The fourth strategy identified by Reyes, voices of expertise, clearly relates to Van 
Leeuwen’s category of authorization. According to Reyes (2011, 786), “voices of 
expertise are displayed in discourse to show the audience that experts in a specific field 
are backing the politician’s proposal with their knowledgeable statements.” Legitimation 
can be realized for example by referring to believable sources, numbers or personal 
experiences (Reyes 2011, 787). The speakers refer to experts or authoritative voices in 
the speech in order to justify the action in question. Example 25 (Reyes 2011, 801) 
demonstrates this. The authority backing up the claim may also stem from the speaker’s 
own institutional position. In relation to this study, a president of a country is also an 
authority. Even though a president is not an expert in the traditional sense of the term, the 
audience may consider that a figure with such an institutional position is well informed 
and can function as “an expert”. Of course, it is an entirely different matter, whether this 
actually is true or not. In the analysis, I employ Van Leeuwen’s strategy of authorization, 
since voices of expertise falls under that category.  
 
Reyes’s last legitimation strategy is altruism. In order not to base their actions only on 
personal interests, political actors try to legitimate the actions by presenting them as 
beneficial for others. The practices are made to look like a service or help to improve the 
wellbeing of others (Reyes 2011, 801-802). An example from Reyes (2011, 802; 
shortened by me from the original): 
 
(26) …And now is the time to act. It’s time to act not only for our sake, it’s time to act 
for the sake of people in Iraq. 
 
In this section I have introduced the strategies of legitimation identified by Reyes in his 
study of legitimation in political discourse. These complement Van Leeuwen’s 
categorisation of legitimation strategies presented in the previous section. Next, I discuss 
some criticism on Van Leeuwen’s work.  
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4.5 Criticism and Previous Research 
 
As with most theoretical frameworks, legitimation frameworks have also been criticised. 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) perceive political discourse as practical argumentation 
and this premise serves as the guiding principle in their approach to political discourse 
analysis. For Fairclough and Fairclough, the greatest problem of Van Leeuwen’s 
framework is the fact that, in their view, Van Leeuwen does not connect the legitimation 
typology well enough to argumentation making them come across as two separate things 
(2012, 110). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), though, do not see these two as separate, 
but consider legitimation as part of argumentation, as a specific type of justification 
among others.  
 
According to Fairclough and Fairclough, Van Leeuwen does not relate legitimation 
clearly enough to the background, to the issues that can be publicly justified and to shared 
beliefs, norms and values (2012, 110). For something to be legitimated, there must be 
something legit to refer to (norms, values, beliefs). For instance, if something is referred 
to as useful or good, it is necessary first to define what is considered useful or good – and 
it is people who define that, since things are not inherently good (or bad). Fairclough and 
Fairclough see that this aspect is not addressed enough in Van Leeuwen’s work.  
 
Fairclough and Fairclough’s views were briefly discussed in section 4.1, in which I stated 
that I consider as legitimations those cases that refer to something shared (such as the 
law) rather than something more personal. I follow this view also in the analysis. As 
regards to referring to the background, I partly agree with Fairclough and Fairclough in 
that I think Van Leeuwen could have addressed the issue more in his work. However, for 
the purposes of this study, I do not see this as an insurmountable issue. In fact, one of the 
aims of this study is to examine how well the legitimation framework overall works with 
this type of topic. Hence, Van Leeuwen’s work functions as a foundation; I do not require 
it to be perfect.  
 
In addition, Fairclough and Fairclough think that Van Leeuwen does not differentiate 
legitimation clearly from explanation. According to them, most of Van Leeuwen’s 
examples (in his 2007 article) do not answer the question “why should we do this” as they 
should, but rather answer questions “why did this happen” or “why did someone do this”. 
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The latter ones provide explanations, not justifications, in Fairclough and Fairclough’s 
view (2012, 250). However, in fact, Van Leeuwen (2007, 91-92) does address 
explanation when quoting Berger and Luckmann: legitimation is a justification that seeks 
to appear as an explanation. Hence, even though Van Leeuwen could have expressed this 
issue more clearly, the criticism of Fairclough and Fairclough is out of place. 
 
In the end Fairclough and Fairclough conclude that despite its drawbacks, Van Leeuwen’s 
work provides a valuable basis for exploring legitimation (2012, 110). For the purpose of 
the current study, this notion is significant. As stated previously, the aim is to use Van 
Leeuwen’s strategies as basis and combine them with Reyes to find out how well this 
typology of legitimation strategies works with the type of topic and data of this study.  
 
While it is evident that legitimation is not without its limitations (see Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2012), Van Leeuwen's work has been applied multiple times in previous 
research in different ways. His work has often been combined with Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) and the study of power. I briefly discussed the connection between power 
and legitimation in section 4.1. In addition, in section 4.3.1, in connection with the 
strategy of authorization, I mentioned how a president is in a position of power. Just being 
the US president, which is a highly prestigious position, is enough to give some 
legitimacy and authority to the figure holding the position. In this study, I will not focus 
on power, because it relates to the speaker (the two US presidents) and not the speech 
itself. However, I will include those aspects to the analysis that have a clear appeal to the 
power position of the president (self-referring authorization). Authorization is only one 
strategy of the legitimation typology, and I will explore other aspects as well. 
 
Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) have studied legitimation strategies employed to deny 
immigrants’ rights in Austria. They use systemic functional discourse methods to conduct 
a detailed analysis of notices rejecting family reunion applications. This is then linked 
through discourse-historical approach to other genres of discourse and to a wider 
historical context. In relation to legitimation, Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999, 111) found 
that the documents analysed contained a “disturbing mixture” of authorization and moral 
abstraction legitimation strategies. These two strategies were followed by rationalization. 
According to Van Leeuwen and Wodak, the result “supports Habermas’ thesis (1992) that 
legal systems must ultimately always be grounded in moral systems” (ibid.). This is 
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consistent with other claims presented previously about legitimation being grounded in 
some shared sense of morality. 
 
In their recent study, Pansardi and Battegazzorre (2018) apply Van Leeuwen’s strategies 
of legitimation. They compare how two European Commission Presidents, José Manuel 
Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker reclaim legitimacy for the European Union in their 
State of the Union Addresses. Pansardi and Battegazzorre discovered that in order to 
legitimate the EU, Barroso used mainly rationalization based on economic goals and 
economic expertise authority. Juncker, on the other hand, relied more on “authorization 
in terms of democratic procedures and popular sovereignty” as well as moral evaluation 
and mythopoesis (Pansardi and Battegazzorre 2018, 15).  
 
Rationalization based on economic reasons has been found as a common legitimation 
strategy in other studies as well. Of course, the topic and its closeness to economic issues 
affects this. For instance, Kekki (2018) has examined legitimation in news media in 
relation to Chinese foreign direct investments in Africa and found that rationalizations 
based on the economic effects were very common. She also found that authorization by 
referring to economic expertise was often used to justify the actions. Vaara’s study on the 
media discussion of the Eurozone crisis in Finland (2014) generated similar results: 
economic expertise and economic rationales were common. The topics of both studies 
are economical, and thus these findings are not very surprising.  
 
In her CDA-oriented study, Bogain (2017) examines discursive legitimation strategies 
used by French president Francois Hollande to justify France’s security-based response 
to the two terrorist attacks in 2015, which had been criticized for being illiberal. Bogain 
found that in his attempt to legitimate the response actions, Hollande especially referred 
to human rights through rationalization and moral evaluation and to the rule of law 
through authorization, and that he was able to discursively reconstruct reality in order to 
justify France’s response to the attacks. Bogain (2017) found that Hollande aimed to 
depict the actions as a moral duty to save France and rest of the world from terrorism. In 
order to do this, Hollande employed moralized mythopoetic past and future 
temporalisation by referring to past and future events that would justify the action taken 
in the present. Bogain argues that “due to the heavily moralised account of 
temporalisation in Hollande’s speeches” the strategy of mythopoesis (storytelling) works 
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best, at least in her study, if it is considered under the strategy of moral evaluation (2017, 
490). The temporalisation relates to Reyes’s strategy of hypothetical future. Bogain’s 
study suggests that the lines between the different strategies are not always as clear cut 
as they might seem, and that there is a possibility of overlap.  
 
Oddo (2011) employs legitimation in a different way. He studies how two US presidents 
legitimate war actions by especially focusing on the representations of Us and Them. 
Oddo (2011, 289) found that the Us/Them polarization is a key strategy used to justify 
war, but it is used in connection with others. One is legitimation by reference to values, 
in which Oddo examines how Us and Them are formed through moral evaluations. 
Second is legitimation by reference to temporality, which appears to relate to Reyes’s 
hypothetical future. The third is legitimation by reference to group membership 
demarcation: who are defined as being part of Us and Them (Oddo 2011, 289-290). 
Oddo’s study shows how it is possible to use only parts of one framework and combine 
those with others to form an applicable framework for the specific topic and data. 
 
Van Leeuwen’s work has been also tested. For instance, in her thesis Saarinen (2013) has 
tested Van Leeuwen’s legitimation theory in connection with metal music lyrics and 
criticism or justification of war. She found that the material of her study did not work as 
well with the typology as Van Leeuwen’s original, but also that a larger corpus would be 
necessary in order to provide more general results. Saarinen used only Van Leeuwen’s 
strategies, while in the current study, also strategies identified by Reyes are included in 
the typology. Hence, my focus is not only on testing Van Leeuwen’s work, but the 
combined typology of legitimation strategies.  
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5 Material and Methods  
 
After presenting the necessary background and theoretical framework, I move on to 
describing the data and methodology of the present study before moving on to the analysis 
part on this thesis. I begin by explaining criteria for data collection after which I present 
the actual data, the presidential statements, in a chronological order. After describing the 
material, I move on to the methods of the study. 
 
5.1 Material  
 
The presidential statements chosen for analysis needed to focus on the PA, in order to 
examine how the actions regarding the agreement were legitimated. Both presidents refer 
to the PA in various occasions (such as debates, and interviews) but these are often very 
short passing mentions within a larger text or speech. In order to examine the 
(de)legitimation of the PA in detail and how it is constructed in the discourse, this study 
includes only statements that specifically addressed the PA in some way. 
 
The criteria resulted in five presidential statements altogether, four from Obama and one 
from Trump meaning that the composition of the data is not balanced. This is due to the 
fact that despite thorough search, only one relevant statement from Trump was found. 
Trump addresses the PA shortly in multiple rallies, debates and speeches, but none of 
these focuses fully on the agreements, while all the statements chosen from Obama focus 
solely on the PA. Thus, in order to apply the criteria as equally as possible and keep the 
discourse as comparable as possible, the short mentions by Trump were excluded from 
the study. Obama’s statements represent 61,3 % of the total amount of data, while 
Trump’s represents 38,7 %. It is important to keep this limitation in mind when comparing 
the results. The difference between the number of relevant statements between the two 
president most likely results from two factors. Firstly, Obama’s administration was 
involved with the PA process longer than Trump’s administration. Secondly, at the time 
of writing this thesis, Trump has been the president for two years compared to Obama’s 
eight years in office.  
 
In addition to the limitation of imbalance, another limitation needs to be mentioned. The 
amount of material included in this study is small: in the five statements analysed there 
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are 7475 words in total with 4581 from Obama and 2894 words from Trump. I considered 
including a presidential proclamation by Obama to the data in order to increase the 
amount. However, this would have resulted in an even larger corpus from Obama and 
thus amplified the uneven balance. Furthermore, a presidential proclamation differs from 
the other statements slightly in its nature and so it would have not been as comparable as 
the others. Hence, all possible material that fits the criteria is included in this study. Thus, 
this will be a more in-depth case study. This provides possibilities for examining the data 
in close detail. 
 
Research ethics were considered during the data collection. There was no issue in this 
regard, because the two presidents are central public figures, and the transcripts of the 
statements were retrieved either from Obama’s official White House Archives website 
(Obama 2015a; 2015b; 2016a and 2016b) or the current official White House website 
(Trump 2017a). Both of these websites and their contents are public. When collecting the 
data, mentions of applause in the transcripts were ignored and not calculated into the 
word count. Video recordings of the statements 1, 2, 4 and 5 were found online 
(YouTube) and these were compared to the transcripts to ensure uniformity. The 
transcripts corresponded to the video recordings. Despite thorough search, no full 
recording of the statement 3 was found. Only parts of the statement were found as video 
recording. These corresponded to the transcript. Based on this, I consider the transcripts 
reliable material for the study. The presidential statements analysed in this thesis are 
presented in table 5. 
 
Statement 
number 
Title Date Number 
of words 
1 Remarks by President Obama at the First 
Session of COP21 
30.11.2015 1742 
2 Statement by the President on the Paris Climate 
Agreement 
12.12.2015 1026 
3 Remarks by President Obama on the United 
States Formally Entering into the Paris 
Agreement 
3.9.2016 1017 
4 Remarks by the President on the Paris 
Agreement 
5.10.2016 796 
5 Statement by President Trump on the Paris 
Climate Accord 
1.6.2017 2894 
Table 5 The presidential statements analysed in the present study 
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It can be seen that these are all referred to either as remarks or as statements. These two 
are slightly different in their meaning. A statement is a more formal declaration of a fact, 
event or opinion, while a remark is more of a comment or brief expression of an opinion 
or criticism. For the purpose of this thesis, this difference is not fundamental, however 
for the sake of clarity, these are referred to in this thesis collectively as statements. 
 
Obama gave a statement at the opening ceremony of the Paris climate change conference 
on 30 November 2015 (statement number 1). In addition to Obama, heads of state or 
government from almost 150 countries addressed the representative in the opening 
ceremony. The event was cast live on the internet. While statement number 1 was uttered 
before the PA was officially adopted, statement number 2 was voiced just when the 
agreement was reached, on 12 December 2015. The statement was given at the White 
House in Washington D.C. As mentioned in section 2.2, the US and China formally joined 
the PA on 3 September 2016 during the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Hangzhou, 
China. Obama gave a statement of this occasion (statement number 3). Finally, on 5 
October 2016, when the threshold for the entry into force of the PA was achieved, Obama 
gave a statement at the White House (statement number 4). The material by president 
Donald Trump analysed in this thesis is the withdrawal announcement (statement 5) he 
made at the White House in Washington D.C. on 1 June 2017. The withdrawal was 
discussed previously in section 2.2. 
 
Due to the video recordings and transcripts of the statements, the actual audience is larger 
than the immediate audience in that speech situation. Since this study focuses on the 
transcripts and legitimation there, also this larger audience and wider context than just 
the one in the specific speech situation is taken into account. Thus, even though in 
statements 2, 4 and 5 the primary audience was rather narrow due to the White House 
location, the actual audience also includes people elsewhere is the US and all over the 
world. Likewise, the immediate audience of statements 1 and 3 is confined to the specific 
speech situation in Hangzhou and Paris, but the actual audience larger than that. Both 
statements 1 and 3 were targeted especially at the international community. As statement 
1 was given at COP21, the main target were the participants of the PA present at the 
event.  
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Final issue to note about the material is that even though the presidents alone voice the 
statements, they are usually carefully drafted together with a team of speechwriters. Thus, 
the presidential statements are not spontaneous, but rather premeditated and intentional. 
As Reyes confirms, intentionality is an essential part of political discourse and 
legitimation: “politicians generally think of the main ideas they want to convey, if not 
word by word, grosso modo, during scheduled public speeches and appearances. There 
is premeditation and often an advisory team to revise and edit politicians’ speeches” 
(Reyes 2011, 783). Thus, we can assume that also both presidents, Obama and Trump, 
and their teams have prepared the statements with a clear intention in mind.   
 
5.2 Methods 
 
This section outlines the methodology of the study. First, the data collection was 
conducted according to the criteria described in section 5.1. I began by reading through 
all the presidential statements to get an overall picture of them and to determine what 
kind of method would best suit the analysis. Close reading of the material was chosen as 
the most appropriate method of analysis, since the small amount of data makes it possible 
to examine the material in close detail.  
 
In addition, as stated in section 4.1, it is not enough to look at word or clause level when 
studying legitimation. Thus, in order to find the legitimation strategies used to justify the 
decision regarding the PA, I needed to examine a higher level and close reading fits this 
well. Furthermore, as mentioned previously in this thesis, legitimation relies on shared 
knowledge, belief and values. Hence, the statements need to be examined by also taking 
into account the socio-political context. For all this, the method of close reading works 
the best.  
 
I went through the presidential statements one by one. With Obama’s statements the aim 
was to identify those parts of the text that would provide answers to questions such as 
Why the Paris Agreement is necessary?, Why is it important to be part of the Paris 
Agreement? and Why it would be a mistake to not be part of the Paris Agreement? With 
Trump’s statements the aim was to identify those parts that answer to questions such as 
Why are we withdrawing from the Paris Agreement? and Why it would be a mistake to 
stay in the Paris Agreement? It is worth noting that I did not expect to find direct answers 
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to these exact questions. Rather the questions functioned as facilitators in finding the 
legitimations, since often these were not expressed explicitly in the data. 
 
After identifying a legitimation, I then classified it according to the strategies presented 
in sections 4.3 and 4.4. The aim was first to identify the main legitimation strategy and if 
possible, a subcategory. After going through the data of each president, I compared the 
results to see what possible differences and similarities there were. 
 
It is necessary to note, that the results of the analysis will be applicable to this specific 
data only. As this is a case study with a small amount of data, no broad generalizations 
on how US presidents use legitimation strategies in their statements can be made, or even 
how Obama and Trump use these legitimation strategies. Increasing the amount of data 
might generate more comprehensive results, but this was not possible for the reasons 
explained in section 5.1. A possibility would have been to include data from other 
speakers (such as Congress or Cabinet members) in addition to the two presidents. 
However, this would arguably have changed the overall direction and focus of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
6 Analysis 
 
This section presents the legitimation strategy analysis of the presidential statements. It 
is important to note that identifying the strategies is not always straightforward. In some 
cases, there can be more than one legitimation strategy at play at the same time. This 
overlap makes identification difficult. It also complicates the presentation of the results. 
For this reason, the analysis is structured according to the speaker (president) and not 
according to different strategies. Thus, I begin by presenting the legitimation strategies 
used by Obama after which Trump’s strategies are presented. I will compare the results 
of the two presidents in the discussion section in order to present the comparison more 
explicitly.  
 
Examples in this analysis were chosen based on their descriptiveness of the legitimation 
strategy in question. Relevant words and phrases have been underlined in some examples. 
However, as has been mentioned multiple times in this thesis, legitimation cannot always 
be identified from specific words. Sometimes it is embedded in a longer stretch of text or 
talk. Hence, in these cases no individual words or phrases can point to the legitimation.  
 
Table 6 presents a recap of the strategies based on which the data will be analysed.  
 
Authorization Legitimation rests on some kind of authority (institutional or a 
person) 
Moral 
evaluation 
Legitimation by reference to some kind of moral values 
Rationalization Legitimation by reference to reason and knowledge; goals, effects 
and use worthiness 
Mythopoesis Legitimation is built through narratives in which legitimate actions 
are rewarded and non-legitimate ones are punished 
Hypothetical 
future 
Legitimation by reference to a threat in the future requiring action in 
the present 
Altruism Legitimation is built on the idea that the action is beneficial for others. 
+ Emotions Legitimation by reference to different emotions 
Table 6 The typology of legitimation strategies 
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6.1 Legitimation strategies used by Obama 
 
In this section I present the results of the analysis of Obama’s statements. Examples from 
all the main legitimation strategies presented in the typology above can be found in 
Obama’s statements. However, some of the strategies occur more often than others.  
 
The least frequent strategy Obama uses is authorization. In the few cases Obama uses 
authorization, the authority is stemmed from persons; there are no cases of impersonal 
authority. There are couple of cases in which Obama uses his own institutional position 
and authority as the President of the United States (POTUS) to convince the audience that 
the PA is necessary. This is a form of personal authority.  
 
(27) Now, just as I believe the Paris Agreement will ultimately prove to be a turning 
point for our planet, I believe that history will judge today’s efforts as pivotal. 
 
Example 27 (Obama 2016a) shows how the mental process verb believe (to follow the 
terminology in Halliday 1985) realizes Obama’s authority. Here, legitimation for the PA 
stems from the shared belief that what the POTUS believes, says and does can have a 
significant influence on other players within the international arena, and within the US. 
 
(28) As one of America’s governors has said, “We are the first generation to feel the 
impact of climate change, and the last generation that can do something about it.” 
 
Obama does not only use his own authority as a legitimation. Example 28 (Obama 2015a) 
is also personal authority, but in this Obama directly quotes Jay Inslee, the Democratic 
governor of Washington, who is known to emphasize actions against climate change. The 
example is from the statement Obama had at COP21. The primary audience was 
international, which is probably the reason Obama did not name the governor, as most 
would not have recognized him. Nevertheless, the quote brings a certain kind of 
verification to Obama’s words. A fellow American politician has the same concern about 
climate change and like Obama, urges people to do something about it. This signals that 
Obama is not the only American politician who beliefs now is the time to act.  
 
In addition, in example 29 (Obama 2015a) Obama also employs role model authority by 
referring to Martin Luther King and his quote there is such a thing as being too late.  
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(29) For I believe, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., that there is such a thing 
as being too late. And when it comes to climate change, that hour is almost upon 
us. But if we act here, if we act now, if we place our own short-term interests 
behind the air that our young people will breathe, and the food that they will eat, 
and the water that they will drink, and the hopes and dreams that sustain their 
lives, then we won't be too late for them.  
 
King was talking about the urgency of ending the Vietnam War in his 1967 speech. 
Obama mirrors this to the threat of climate change. With the reference, Obama is 
assuming the international audience (from COP21) is aware who King was and what 
made him significant enough to be quoted in this situation. Using King’s words would 
not bring any significant legitimation to the statement if the audience did not know of 
him.  
 
Later in example 29 also hypothetical future and altruism are employed to legitimate why 
the PA is necessary and why it is important people act now. As mentioned in section 4.4, 
hypothetical future usually involves describing a threat in the future needing imminent 
action now. Here, that threat is (naturally) climate change. In example 29, Obama is 
describing a positive future that will happen, if action is taken now and the PA is 
accomplished. This future will also be beneficial for the next generation. Thus here, 
Obama uses a combination of altruism and hypothetical future. He urges people to place 
the interest of future generations ahead of their own interest in order to justify why the 
PA and being part of it is crucial.  
 
There are also other cases of hypothetical future in Obama’s statements; the strategy is 
employed both explicitly through a conditional structure and more abstractly without any 
conditionality. Obama uses hypothetical future mostly to legitimate the PA and its 
importance. 
 
(30) That future is not one of strong economies, nor is it one where fragile states can 
find their footing. That future is one that we have the power to change. Right here. 
Right now. But only if we rise to this moment. 
(31) And if we follow on the commitments that this agreement embodies, history may 
well judge it as a turning point for our planet. 
(32) This is the single-best chance that we have to deal with a problem that could end 
up transforming this planet in a way that makes it very difficult for us to deal 
with all the other challenges that we may face. 
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There are cases in which hypothetical future is used to describe what would happen if the 
PA is successful. In example 30 (Obama 2015a), the reference to the future is established 
by that future and without a clear conditional structure. The future Obama is describing 
thus appears more certain. However, only if we rise to this moment slightly weakens this 
effect. The clause reminds the audience that this future scenario will not happen if the PA 
is not accomplished. In example 31 (Obama 2016b), then, the future scenario is 
constructed through a more explicit conditional structure if we follow + may judge. In 
contrast, example 32 (Obama 2016a) shows what could happen, if the PA is not 
accomplished. Here the modal verb could is used, meaning that the statement has a lower 
degree of certainty (opposed to the first two sentences of example 30). Hence, for 
delegitimating the scenario in which the PA is not accomplished, Obama does not employ 
as much certainty as for legitimating the importance of the PA. 
 
Obama uses storytelling in multiple occasions. Not all are explicit narratives, but cases 
which include story-like elements, and are thus referred here as narratives and placed 
under the legitimation strategy of mythopoesis. Both of Van Leeuwen’s subcategories are 
present in Obama’s statements: moral tales functioning as legitimation and a cautionary 
tale as delegitimation.  
(33) Of course, it took a long time to reach this day. One of the reasons I ran for this 
office was to make America a leader in this mission. And over the past eight years, 
we’ve done just that. In 2009, we salvaged a chaotic climate summit in 
Copenhagen, establishing the principle that all nations have a role to play in 
combating climate change. And at home, we led by example, with historic 
investments in growing industries like wind and solar that created a steady stream 
of new jobs. We set the first-ever nationwide standards to limit the amount of 
carbon pollution that power plants can dump into the air our children breathe. 
From the cars and trucks we drive to the homes and businesses in which we live 
and work, we’ve changed fundamentally the way we consume energy.  Now, keep 
in mind, the skeptics said these actions would kill jobs. And instead, we saw -- 
even as we were bringing down these carbon levels -- the longest streak of job 
creation in American history. We drove economic output to new highs. And we 
drove our carbon pollution to its lowest levels in two decades. We continued to 
lead by example with our historic joint announcement with China two years ago, 
where we put forward even more ambitious climate targets. And that achievement 
encouraged dozens of other countries to set more ambitious climate targets of their 
own. And that, in turn, paved the way for our success in Paris…  
(34) I imagine taking my grandkids, if I’m lucky enough to have some, to the park 
someday, and holding their hands, and hearing their laughter, and watching a quiet 
sunset, all the while knowing that our work today prevented an alternate future 
that could have been grim; that our work, here and now, gave future generations 
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cleaner air, and cleaner water, and a more sustainable planet. And what could be 
more important than that? 
The lengthy example 33 (Obama 2016b) demonstrates how Obama uses a moral tale to 
describe what steps have already been taken towards a better future. These past actions 
are presented as positive examples of what could also be accomplished with the PA, thus 
aiming to legitimate its importance. These moral tales also include cases in which Obama 
describes the climate leadership of the US and China and how the two countries are 
showing an example for the rest of the world with their action. A different kind of moral 
tale, example 34 (Obama 2015b), depicts a positive and happy situation which will be the 
reward for acting now, for joining the PA. Thus, here the tale does not refer to the past, 
but to the future. In contrast, cautionary tales are more based on delegitimating the 
alternative scenario: not accomplishing the PA.  
 
(35) This summer, I saw the effects of climate change firsthand in our northernmost 
state, Alaska, where the sea is already swallowing villages and eroding shorelines; 
where permafrost thaws and the tundra burns; where glaciers are melting at a pace 
unprecedented in modern times.  And it was a preview of one possible future – a 
glimpse of our children’s fate if the climate keeps changing faster than our efforts 
to address it. Submerged countries. Abandoned cities. Fields that no longer grow. 
Political disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more floods of desperate 
peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own.  
 
Example 35 (Obama 2015a) first describes what is already happening in Alaska because 
of climate change. The tale ends with a warning: what will happen, if nothing is done. 
Within the narrative is another combination of hypothetical future and altruism, which 
was discussed above. In example 33 there is a short mentioning of a possible threatening 
future that is not favorable to the next generation. This then functions as delegitimation, 
as it is describing what could happen, if the PA is not accomplished. 
 
The reference of the next generation leads us to the strategy of altruism, which is very 
common throughout Obama’s statements. With altruism, Obama aims to generate 
emotions among the audience; most often the feeling of hope that others, the next 
generation, will be better off due to the PA. 
 
(36) …an agreement that helps us lift people from poverty without condemning the 
next generation to a planet that’s beyond its capacity to repair. 
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(37) But the knowledge that the next generation will be better off for what we do here 
– can we imagine a more worthy reward that that? Passing that on to our children 
and our grandchildren, so that when they look back and they see what we did here 
in Paris, they can take pride in our achievement.  
(38) What matters is that today we can be more confident that this planet is going to 
be in better shape for the next generation. 
(39) Today is a historic day in the fight to protect our planet for future generations.  
(40) That’s our most important mission, to make sure our kids and our grandkids have 
at least as beautiful a planet, and hopefully more beautiful, than the one that we 
have.  
 
Altruism is usually employed as legitimation rather than delegitimation. However, 
example 36 (Obama 2015a) shows how Obama aims to delegitimate the opposite scenario 
in which the PA is not accomplished by stating how the next generation could be worse 
off without the agreement. By contrast, in order to legitimate the PA, Obama describes 
how the wellbeing of our children or our grandkids, future generations or the next 
generation will be better with the new agreement. Examples 37 (Obama 2015a), 38 
(Obama 2015b) as well as examples 39 and 40 (both Obama 2016b) all depicts this 
strategy. 
 
In addition to altruism, the strategy of moral evaluation is common in Obama’s 
statements. As was explained in section 4.3.2, moral evaluation is often implicitly used 
and thus difficult to identify. It is often more on emotions and certain values denoting 
whether something is good or bad. As altruism, also with moral evaluation Obama often 
aims to inflict some kind of emotions in the audience in order to legitimate the PA. 
 
(41) And we salute the people of Paris for insisting this crucial conference go on – an 
act of defiance that proves nothing will deter us from building the future we want 
for our children. 
(42) Today, thanks to strong, principled, American leadership, that’s the world that 
we’ll leave to our children -- a world that is safer and more secure, more 
prosperous, and more free. And that is our most important mission in our short 
time here on this Earth.  
 
There are some cases of evaluation in Obama’s statements. Sometimes these may be in 
connection with another legitimation strategy. In example 41 (Obama 2015a), Obama 
highlights the significance of COP21 with an evaluative adjective crucial. The example 
also includes another case of altruism, as Obama refers to the conference and the PA 
being good and important especially to our children. Example 42 (Obama 2015b) also 
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contains evaluative adjectives. These are aimed to legitimate the PA and its possible 
consequences. Obama’s message here is that a better world for the sake of our children 
should be the most important mission right now, and the PA will help accomplish this. 
This idea of the PA helping to achieve a better future for the next generation is very 
apparent throughout Obama’s statements, as was discussed above. It is noteworthy that 
all four of Obama’s statements end with a similar sentence as the second-to-last sentence 
of example 42. Each case describes a world that will be safer, more prosperous, more 
secure and more free than the current one, if action is taken and the PA is accomplished, 
thus evaluating the PA as good instead of bad.  
 
In another theme of evaluation, Obama aims to legitimate the PA by associating it with a 
certain feeling of togetherness and a common purpose that the world, which for him is 
the self-group in this case, needs.  
(43) …we can show the world what is possible when we come together, united in 
common effort and by a common purpose. 
(44) Together, we’ve shown what’s possible when the world stands as one. 
(45) Because no nation, not even one as powerful as ours, can solve this challenge 
alone. And no country, no matter how small, can sit on the sidelines. All of us had 
to solve it together. 
(46) Yes, diplomacy can be difficult, and progress on the world stage can be slow. But 
together, we’re proving that it is possible.  
 
Examples 43 (Obama 2015a), 44 and 45 (Obama 2015b) as well as 46 (Obama 2016a) 
include evaluative words such as together, possible or common purpose that are used 
depict how the PA can be accomplished together as a united world and how it is possible 
to change the world for better. All these evaluative words aim to describe the PA and 
issues related to it as good.  
 
(47) Let that be the common purpose here in Paris. A world that is worthy of our 
children. A world that is marked not by conflict, but by cooperation; and not by 
human suffering, but by human progress.  
 
Example 47 (Obama 2015a) presents an analogy, another subcategory of moral 
evaluation. Obama legitimates the PA by depicting it as a way to form a better world. He 
compares this better world to the present one, which is associated with negative 
connotation words conflict and human suffering. These are opposite to those associated 
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with the future world: cooperation and human progress. Thus, here the negative other-
representation and positive self-representation is at place. This comparison continues in 
the next sentence, in which the better world that will be accomplished through the PA is 
compared to the one that we inherited.  
 
(48) What greater rejection of those who would tear down our world than marshaling 
our best efforts to save it? 
 
In example 48 (Obama 2015a), Obama refers to the Paris terrorist attacks that occurred 
in November 2015, just before COP21. This is another example of an analogy. Obama is 
comparing the positive effort to save the world (through the PA) to the negative violent 
attacks in order to highlight how the PA is good and while the violence is bad.   
(49) What should give us hope that this is a turning point, that this is the moment we 
finally determined we would save our planet, is the fact that our nations share a 
sense of urgency about this challenge and a growing realization that it is within 
our power to do something about it.  
The third subcategory of moral evaluation, abstraction, is also present in Obama’s 
statements. The strategy is employed to legitimate the PA; to explain why it is good. 
Example 49 (Obama 2015b) demonstrates a recurrent phrase in the data: Obama describes 
the PA in a moralized way as a turning point. If the PA is accomplished, it could make a 
lasting change in the world. The example includes the recurring element in Obama’s 
statements: inflicting the feeling of hope. This is related to the strategy of legitimation 
through emotions that is often expressed within other strategies, especially with moral 
evaluation. Throughout his statements, Obama aims to create the feelings of hope and 
pride. He states how the PA will change the future, provide a better world for the next 
generation and how this should give us hope (see examples 30, 34, 38, 40, 44 and 49).  
 
(50) Today, the American people can be proud – because this historic agreement is a 
tribute to American leadership. 
 
Obama also remarks in the statements he voiced within the US (Obama 2015b and 2016b) 
how the Americans should be proud of their leadership in the matter. Example 50 (2015b) 
demonstrates this. In addition to the more positive emotions of hope and pride, Obama 
aims to inflict fear; fear of the growing threat of climate change (see examples 28 and 32) 
and fear for the future of the following generations (see examples 29, 35 and 36). As 
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Reyes (2011, 790) states, “fear is perhaps the most effective emotion to trigger a response 
from the interlocutors”, and thus it can work as a powerful way of legitimation. 
 
Legitimations based on rationalization (more reason than emotions) occur quite often in 
Obama’s statements. As with moral evaluation, rationalizations were not always easy to 
identify, as these were not often very explicitly expressed in the data. There are cases of 
instrumental rationality, in which the PA is legitimated by referring to its positive goals, 
uses and effects. When analysing instrumental rationality, it is easy to mix legitimations 
to purposes. The difference between these two was discussed in section 4.3.3. I have 
included examples of both to demonstrate the difference.  
 
(51) … an agreement to roll back the pollution we put into our skies. 
(52) …a strong global agreement to reduce carbon pollution and to set the world on a 
low-carbon course. 
Example 52 (Obama 2016b) is classified as a purpose, since there is no moral component; 
it only states that the purpose of the PA is to reduce pollution without no additional 
evaluating or moralizing it further. In contrast, example 51 (Obama 2015a) is classified 
as instrumental rationality, since we put into our skies attaches a moral evaluation to the 
pollution: it specifies who is to blame for it. Example 51 is goals-orientation: it states the 
goal of the PA with the to roll back -phrase.  
 
(53) So our task here in Paris is to turn these achievements into an enduring framework 
for human progress -- not a stopgap solution, but a long-term strategy that gives 
the world confidence in a low-carbon future. 
(54) But make no mistake, this agreement will help delay or avoid some of the worst 
consequences of climate change. It will help other nations ratchet down their 
dangerous carbon emissions over time…  
In addition to goal-orientation, also the two other subcategories are present in Obama’s 
statements. Examples 53 (Obama 2015a) and 54 (Obama 2016b) demonstrate effect-
orientation: the positive effects and the outcomes of the PA are described. In example 53, 
the effect is an enduring framework for human progress and giving the world confidence 
in a better future. Here, words such as enduring, progress and confidence function as the 
moralized elements. In example 54, the effect is reducing the consequences of climate 
change and helping countries to decrease their emissions. Moralization stems from the 
evaluative adjectives worst and dangerous. 
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(55) And by sending a signal that this is going to be our future -- a clean energy 
future -- it opens up the floodgates for businesses, and scientists, and engineers 
to unleash high-tech, low-carbon investment and innovation at a scale that we’ve 
never seen before. 
(56) And by empowering businesses, scientists, engineers, workers, and the private 
sector -- investors -- to work together, this agreement represents the best chance 
we’ve had to save the one planet that we’ve got. 
 
The two examples above are cases of means-orientation; they describe the uses of the 
PA. In example 55 (Obama 2016b) the PA is legitimated by referring to its usefulness in 
sending a signal to the world. The moral element making this a legitimation instead of a 
purpose, is at the end of the sentence: at a scale that we’ve never seen before. In example 
56 (Obama 2015b), the PA is useful since it empowers different social actors and hence 
is the best chance to save the one planet that we’ve got (moral element).  
 
Theoretical rationality, in which legitimation stems more from the natural order of things, 
is less apparent in Obama’s statements.  
 
(57) Our understanding of the ways human beings disrupt the climate advances by the 
day. Fourteen of the fifteen warmest years on record have occurred since the year 
2000 -- and 2015 is on pace to be the warmest year of all. No nation -- large or 
small, wealthy or poor -- is immune to what this means. 
 
Example 57 (Obama 2015a) demonstrates a case of theoretical rationality. The excerpt 
cannot be easily placed in any of Van Leeuwen’s subcategories. However, I place it under 
rationalization, since it functions as a legitimation for the PA by referring to “the way 
things are” (Van Leeuwen 2007, 103): global warming is a fact and this means that action 
is needed.  
 
I have now presented the analysis of Obama’s statements based on the typology of 
legitimation strategies. All in all, Obama used mostly altruism, mythopoesis and moral 
evaluation. Also rationalization was common, but not as much as these three strategies. 
Examples of all main legitimation strategies were found. Overall, the tone in Obama's 
statements is more positive than negative. Obama is highlighting what good will come of 
the PA thus legitimating its importance and necessity. He does not really concentrate on 
describing what bad will happen if the PA is not accomplished. Most of the examples 
introduced in this section are legitimations, not delegitimations.  
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As has become apparent already, not all examples of legitimation are easy to classify only 
to one specific category, such as the combination of hypothetical future and altruism in 
example 29. Cases of mythopoesis can be tricky, because they are often longer than other 
legitimation cases and may thus include multiple other, smaller, legitimations. It is up to 
the researcher whether they decide to analyse and categorize only the higher level 
legitimation or also the smaller one. When discussing example 35, I chose to point out 
also the legitimation strategy within the cautionary tale.  
 
In addition, there are some more ambiguous cases which appear to be legitimations, but 
do not fall clearly within one category of subcategory in the typology.  
(58) As the world’s two largest economies and two largest emitters, our entrance into 
this agreement continues the momentum of Paris, and should give the rest of the 
world confidence –- whether developed or developing countries -– that a low-
carbon future is where the world is heading. 
(59) So this gives us the best possible shot to save the one planet we’ve got. 
 
I consider example 58 (Obama 2016a) as a legitimation, since Obama aims to justify why 
it is important for the US to be part of the PA. He describes how the US and China, the 
largest economies and emitters, set an example by joining the PA, and other countries 
will hopefully follow in their footsteps. However, I cannot clearly classify this into any 
of the legitimation strategies. It could be a rationalization, instrumental rationality, but 
the reference to the goals, uses and effects is not explicit enough. Also example 59 
(Obama 2016b) appears to be a legitimation, but it cannot be placed straightforwardly 
into any of the categories. It could be a case of theoretical rationality as a prediction. 
However, predictions are based on expertise not authority, and therefore in principle, they 
could be revoked by conflicting expertise (Van Leeuwen 2007, 104). Hence, I did not 
consider there to be enough expertise or prior knowledge7 to classify the example clearly 
in this category.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Not in a similar way as in Van Leeuwen’s example based on a mother’s experience on 
children crying (2007, 104). 
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6.2 Legitimation strategies used by Trump 
 
This section presents the analysis of Trump’s statement on the PA withdrawal. All 
examples in this section are from Trump (2017a). In order to save space, I will not mark 
this reference in connection with each example. Examples for almost every main 
legitimation strategy in the typology could be found in the data, however, there were no 
cases of altruism. 
 
The strategy of authorization is very predominant in Trump’s statements. There are 
examples of both personal and impersonal authority. Even though they stem the authority 
from different sources, the authorization cases all work together to form a strong looking 
legitimation for Trump administration’s withdrawal decision.  
 
(60) As President, I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American 
citizens. 
(61) I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris. I promised I would 
exit or renegotiate any deal which fails to serve America’s interests. 
(62) Believe me, we have massive legal liability if we stay in. 
(63) As President, I have one obligation, and that obligation is to the American people. 
 
Like Obama, Trump uses personal authority and his own position as the POTUS to 
legitimate the withdrawal. Examples 60-63 depict this legitimation strategy. The mere 
fact that Trump is the POTUS is thought to give more weight to his words. In addition, 
he refers to the promises he has made and to the obligations he has as president. It appears 
that for Trump, the we-group (self-group, Us) is clearly defined as the US and its people. 
In the examples above, it can be seen how Trump aims to legitimate his decision by 
showing the decision (withdrawing from the PA) as his presidential duty to protect 
Americans. To strengthen this impact further, Trump employs the phrase believe me on 
multiple occasions (see example 62) throughout the statement. The phrase is used in order 
to form a closer connection and trust between the speaker and the audience. Trump aims 
to convince the audience that he is right, that this is the solution, because he (as the 
POTUS) is saying so. See also examples 64 and 75 below for other cases of believe me.  
 
(64) Compliance with the terms of the Paris Accord and the onerous energy restrictions 
it has placed on the United States could cost America as much as 2.7 million lost 
jobs by 2025 according to the National Economic Research Associates. This 
includes 440,000 fewer manufacturing jobs – not what we need – believe me, this 
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is not what we need… According to this same study, by 2040, compliance with 
the commitments put into place by the previous administration would cut 
production for the following sectors: paper down 12 percent; cement down 23 
percent; iron and steel down 38 percent; coal – and I happen to love the coal 
miners – down 86 percent; natural gas down 31 percent. The cost to the economy 
at this time would be close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial 
jobs, while households would have $7,000 less income and; in many cases, much 
worse than that. 
 
Trump uses expert authority in multiple occasions, especially to delegitimate the decision 
to join the PA. Example 64 demonstrates how he appeals to a study by National Economic 
Research Associates (NERA), which is a private economic consulting firm, to list what 
could happen to the US economy, if the country stays in the PA. This theme of national 
economic interest is visible throughout Trump’s statements and expressed by different 
legitimation strategies. Here, by referring to a study that is supposed to be objective, 
Trump aims to convey to the audience that also these experts think that the PA would be 
harmful to the US. Thus, Trump does not rely only on his own authority to explain why 
the PA is bad but backs up this with expert opinion. The above-mentioned phrase believe 
me is present in example 60 in between the expert authority.  
 
Example 64 is a complex one, since it appears to include multiple legitimation strategies 
at once. In addition to the already discussed expert authority, there is hypothetical future 
in the form of modal verbs describing what would happen in the future, if the US stays in 
the PA. I will discuss hypothetical future in Trump’s statements later. Thirdly, the 
example also includes rationalization in the form of the national economic interest.  
 
Last note on example 64: alluding to numbers also plays a significant part in the 
authorization. According to Van Dijk numbers “indicate precision and exactness” (1988, 
84) and thus can make the information appear more factual. It is of an entirely different 
matter whether these numbers actually are true or false. The NERA report is debatable 
according to multiple sources due to its sponsors, who are known to include for instance 
coal companies and a pro-business think-tank. It is not within the scope of this thesis to 
delve deeper into this issue8.  
 
                                                 
8 See Holden et. al (2017) for more discussion on misleading information in Trump’s 
statement. 
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(65) As the Wall Street Journal wrote this morning: “The reality is that withdrawing is 
in America’s economic interest and won’t matter much to the climate.” 
 
Example 65 is classified as role model authority. Van Leeuwen does not specify whether 
role model authority needs to include actual humans. In this study I chose to place under 
this strategy also those cases where the authorization stems from well-known or well-
respected sources that cannot be linked with specific individuals (such as popular 
newspapers). In example 65, Trump directly quotes the Wall Street Journal, which in 
2017 was the leading US newspaper by a circulation of over 1,18 million (Statista 2019). 
Thus, it can be said that the newspaper has a certain status and recognition among many 
people and this fact is thought to give additional support to Trump’s words. The choice 
of quoting specifically the Wall Street Journal is noteworthy, since the newspaper is often 
reluctant to address the impacts of climate change, but by contrast tends to emphasize the 
negative economic consequences of climate change action (see Feldman, Hart and 
Milosevic 2017 for further discussion). Here the above-mentioned theme of national 
economic interest is again present. 
 
(66) There are serious legal and constitutional issues as well. Foreign leaders in 
Europe, Asia, and across the world should not have more to say with respect to 
the U.S. economy than our own citizens and their elected representatives. Thus, 
our withdrawal from the agreement represents a reassertion of America’s 
sovereignty. Our Constitution is unique among all the nations of the world, and it 
is my highest obligation and greatest honor to protect it.  
 
In addition to personal authority, impersonal authority is used in Trump’s statements. 
Example 66 includes a reference to the law and the constitution of the US. The serious 
legal and constitutional issues Trump refers to mean the decision of Obama 
administration to bypass the Senate in order to adopt the PA (see section 2.2). Trump 
aims to portray the PA as illegal, meaning it would be only right to withdraw from it. 
Example 62 above includes another case of legitimation by reference to law (legal 
liability). Also the personal authority in example 66 (my highest obligation and greatest 
honor) is similar to the cases of personal authority as POTUS presented in the beginning 
of this section.  
 
In addition to authorization, another common legitimation strategy for Trump is 
rationalization, which refers to reason and common sense (as opposed to moral 
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evaluation referring more to emotions). Here the theme of national economic interest is 
again visible.  
 
(67) …the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our 
country… 
(68) Not only does this deal subject our citizens to harsh economic restrictions… 
 
Trump delegitimates the PA in multiple occasions by describing its negative impacts to 
the US economy and thus explaining why it would not be reasonable for the US to stay 
in the agreement. This is often done with instrumental rationality and especially effect-
orientation. Examples 67 and 68 demonstrate this. The economic effect or outcome of 
the PA that Trump describes is underlined in both examples. These outcomes are stated 
as though they are strict facts, without any room for uncertainty. As was explained in the 
previous section, when analysing instrumental rationality, it is important to note the 
difference between a legitimation and a purpose. In examples 67 and 68 the moral 
elements are evaluative words draconian, burdens and harsh. 
 
(69) …should dispel any doubt as to the real reason why foreign lobbyists wish to keep 
our magnificent country tied up and bound down by this agreement: It’s to give 
their country an economic edge over the United States. 
(70) The Paris Agreement handicaps the United States economy in order to win praise 
from the very foreign capitals and global activists that have long sought to gain 
wealth at our country’s expense. 
 
In addition to effect-orientation, the economic rationale is expressed with goal-
orientation. Examples 69 and 70 show how Trump aims to delegitimate the PA by 
describing that the motive of the agreement is to provide foreigners an economic 
advantage over the US. The moral component in these two examples cannot be placed in 
a specific word, rather the moralization is a larger element in both. In example 69, to keep 
our magnificent country tied up and bound down could be said to be the moral component. 
In example 70, the moralization comes explicit through words and phrases such as 
handicaps, to win praise and to gain wealth at our country’s expense.  
 
(71) This agreement is less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a 
financial advantage over the United States. 
 
Besides instrumental rationality, Trump also employs theoretical rationality. Example 71 
is a case of definition, in which the PA is defined in a moralized way as a disadvantage 
 59 
to the US (see the underlined part). This definition then works as the legitimation by 
justifying why it is not rational to stay in the agreement. There are other similar cases of 
definition in Trump’s statement.  
 
Clear narratives (examples of mythopoesis) were not very easy to find in Trump’s 
statement. There are couple excerpts that could be identified as having story-like 
characteristics.  
 
(72) We have among the most abundant energy reserves on the planet, sufficient to lift 
millions of America’s poorest workers out of poverty. Yet, under this agreement, 
we are effectively putting these reserves under lock and key, taking away the great 
wealth of our nation — it’s great wealth, it’s phenomenal wealth; not so long ago, 
we had no idea we had such wealth — and leaving millions and millions of 
families trapped in poverty and joblessness. 
(73) One by one, we are keeping the promises I made to the American people during 
my campaign for President –- whether it’s cutting job-killing regulations; 
appointing and confirming a tremendous Supreme Court justice; putting in place 
tough new ethics rules; achieving a record reduction in illegal immigration on our 
southern border; or bringing jobs, plants, and factories back into the United States 
at numbers which no one until this point thought even possible.  And believe me, 
we’ve just begun.  The fruits of our labor will be seen very shortly even more so. 
 
Example 72 is a cautionary tale describing what happens, if the US stays in the PA: a lot 
of people would suffer from poverty and joblessness. Example 73 on the contrary is a 
moral tale showing what good has already been done and how withdrawing from the PA 
would be another step in fulfilling the line of promises made. Personal authority as 
explained in the beginning of this analysis section is also present in example 73: believe 
me. 
 
There are multiple cases of hypothetical future in Trump’s statement. These are 
sometimes within other strategies, as was the case in example 64 above. Trump employs 
hypothetical future to delegitimate the PA, as can be seen in examples 74-76.  
 
(74) Staying in the agreement could also pose serious obstacles for the United States 
as we begin the process of unlocking the restrictions on America’s abundant 
energy reserves, which we have started very strongly. It would once have been 
unthinkable that an international agreement could prevent the United States from 
conducting its own domestic economic affairs, but this is the new reality we face 
if we do not leave the agreement or if we do not negotiate a far better deal. 
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(75) The risks grow as historically these agreements only tend to become more and 
more ambitious over time. In other words, the Paris framework is a starting point 
— as bad as it is — not an end point. And exiting the agreement protects the 
United States from future intrusions on the United States’ sovereignty and 
massive future legal liability.  
(76) At 1 percent growth, renewable sources of energy can meet some of our domestic 
demand, but at 3 or 4 percent growth, which I expect, we need all forms of 
available American energy, or our country will be at grave risk of brownouts and 
blackouts, our businesses will come to a halt in many cases, and the American 
family will suffer the consequences in the form of lost jobs and a very diminished 
quality of life. 
 
Example 74 has a clear conditional structure including could and if, while in example 75 
there is no conditional structure, but the possible future is still present. Example 76 then 
has a higher degree of certainty than in example 76, since the modal verb will is used and 
there is no if. 
 
When it comes to the strategy of moral evaluation, a clear theme of (un)fairness can be 
seen in Trump’s statement. In multiple occasions Trump depicts the PA as unfair to the 
US and placing the US at a disadvantage, especially economically, compared to other 
countries. There are multiple cases, in which Trump explicitly uses evaluative words, 
which examples below demonstrate.  
 
(77) But the bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair, at the highest level, to 
the United States. 
(78) …to either negotiate our way back into Paris, under the terms that are fair to the 
United States and its workers, or to negotiate a new deal that protects our country 
and its taxpayers. 
(79) I will work to ensure that America remains the world’s leader on environmental 
issues, but under a framework that is fair and where the burdens and 
responsibilities are equally shared among the many nations all around the world. 
(80) No responsible leader can put the workers – and the people – of their country at 
this debilitating and tremendous disadvantage. 
 
Here I have also included some nouns and verbs in addition to adjectives, since these 
appear to contribute to the moral evaluation. In example 77, the adjective unfair is used 
to moralize the PA negatively and hence to delegitimate the decision to join it. In 
examples 78 and 79 then, the adjective fair denotes possible new terms or a new 
agreement that could replace the PA. Protects, burdens and responsibilities all build up 
the moralized image of an unfair situation that needs to be changed. In example 80 Trump 
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refers to himself as a responsible leader who has to protect his people from a 
disadvantage, which is evaluated with strong adjectives debilitating and tremendous.  
 
(81) China will be allowed to build hundreds of additional coal plants. So we can’t 
build the plants, but they can, according to this agreement. India will be allowed 
to double its coal production by 2020. Think of it: India can double their coal 
production. We’re supposed to get rid of ours. Even Europe is allowed to continue 
construction of coal plants.  
(82) The fact that the Paris deal hamstrings the United States, while empowering some 
of the world’s top polluting countries… 
(83) As someone who cares deeply about the environment, which I do, I cannot in good 
conscience support a deal that punishes the United States — which is what it does 
-– the world’s leader in environmental protection, while imposing no meaningful 
obligations on the world’s leading polluters. 
 
The theme of unfairness is also expressed more implicitly through analogies, in which 
the unfair situation of the US in compared to others in order to delegitimate the PA. In 
example 81 the others are China and India, while in examples 82 and 83 the others are 
more widely world’s leading polluters. Interestingly, Trump seem to avoid portraying the 
US among those leading polluting countries, which it is (see section 2.2 for data). Instead 
of mentioning this, Trump only describes the US the world’s leader in environmental 
protection. 
 
(84) At what point does America get demeaned? At what point do they start laughing 
at us as a country? We want fair treatment for its citizens, and we want fair 
treatment for our taxpayers. We don’t want other leaders and other countries 
laughing at us anymore. And they won’t be. They won’t be. 
(85) It is time to put Youngstown, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania – along with many, many other locations within our great country – 
before Paris, France. 
 
The third subcategory of moral evaluation, abstraction, is also present in Trump’s 
statement. In example 84 the PA is described in a very abstract way as an action causing 
the world to laugh at the US. If the US withdraws from the agreement, the laugher stops. 
Example 85 then the withdrawal action is expressed as putting the countries own cities in 
front Paris, the symbolic centre of the agreement.  
 
Overall, Trump mostly uses authorization, hypothetical future and rationalization 
followed closely by moral evaluation. No single strategy stands out as a dominating one. 
Interestingly, no cases of altruism could be found in Trump’s statement. This means that 
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it is the only main strategy of legitimation not present. The tone of Trump's statement is 
more negative than positive. Out of the 27 examples in this section most are 
delegitimations explaining why the PA is bad and what negative consequences there are. 
The legitimation examples justify why the US is leaving the agreement in a more positive 
tone. These are cases of personal authority (as in presidential duty or obligation), 
mythopoesis (moral tale) and moral evaluation. 
 
As was the case with Obama, some of the examples from Trump’s statement are not 
straightforward. For instance, as we saw with example 64, more than one strategy can be 
identified in a case of legitimation. In addition, it is also necessary to mention some 
ambiguous cases from Trump’s statement. These were not easy to classify into a specific 
category.  
 
(86) We will be environmentally friendly, but we’re not going to put our businesses 
out of work and we’re not going to lose our jobs. We’re going to grow; we’re 
going to grow rapidly. 
 
Example 86 is a challenging one. In the first sentence, Trump aims to delegitimate the 
PA, describing how staying in it would put businesses and jobs in danger. In the second 
sentence he then legitimates the withdrawal with the prospect of growth that would 
follow. Example 86 is similar to example 59, an ambiguous case from Obama, in that this 
could also be theoretical rationality as a prediction, but I do not consider there to be 
enough expertise (over authority) to clearly place the case in this category. Example 86 
might also be classified as moral evaluation as an analogy, in which the delegitimation of 
the first sentence contrasts with the legitimation of the second sentence. In addition, 
example 86 includes elements of hypothetical future in that Trump is referring to what 
would or would not happen in different situations. 
 
(87) The Paris Accord would undermine our economy, hamstring our workers, weaken 
our sovereignty, impose unacceptable legal risks, and put us at a permanent 
disadvantage to the other countries of the world. 
 
Another ambiguous case, example 87 contains elements of multiple legitimation 
strategies. The modal verb would indicates some hypothetical future. References to 
economy and jobs relate to rationalization and the economic rationale, while references 
to sovereignty and legal risks relate to impersonal authority. Lastly, the theme of 
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unfairness is also present. Hence, it is not possible to categorize the example into one 
specific strategy. I would need to go to a deeper level and analyse the case almost word-
to-word, but since I have not done that with other examples, I decided not to do it with 
this one.  
 
I have now analysed the data from both presidents, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. I 
presented the presidents’ uses of the legitimation strategies and provided some ambiguous 
cases for both. The comparison of the two will follow in the next section. I will also relate 
the results within the larger socio-political context and discuss how well the legitimation 
strategy typology worked in the current study.  
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7 Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to find out how two US presidents from two different 
administrations and parties justified their decisions to either join or withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The US is a superpower in the world politics, a 
great emitter of CO2 and as a wealthy country potentially a major financial contributor. 
Therefore, the perspectives of the US leadership on climate change could have a larger 
influence for the rest of the world. That's why it was important to study the presidents' 
use of legitimation strategies. Furthermore, no previous studies on this topic were found, 
hence the current study filled a research gap. 
 
The following research questions were laid out in the beginning of this thesis: 
1. What discursive (de)legitimation strategies presidents Barack Obama and Donald 
Trump use to justify the decision to join the Paris Agreement and to withdraw 
from it? 
2. How the presidents’ uses of the strategies differ from or resemble each other? 
3. How the used strategies relate to the larger socio-political context, and especially 
to the two different US political parties and administrations in terms of their 
respective climate related policies? 
 
In addition to the set research questions, this study aimed to test how well the legitimation 
strategies framework fits with a study of this kind. The framework of legitimation 
strategies has not been previously applied in the way that this study has. No prior research 
on legitimation with this data could be found, and therefore this study filled an interesting 
research gap in here as well. In order to better examine how the framework fitted with the 
topic and data of this study, I provided examples from Van Leeuwen and Reyes in the 
theoretical part. This made it easier to compare my examples to those. I will return to this 
issue after first discussing the research questions.  
 
To answer the first research question, I analysed presidential statements from both Obama 
and Trump as discussed in the previous section. The section presented both presidents' 
use of the legitimation strategies according to the typology of this study. Examples of all 
main legitimation strategies were found in Obama's statements, and for Trump, examples 
of all other categories except for altruism were found. Obama mostly used legitimations 
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for the PA, while Trump employed mostly delegitimations against the PA. This result is 
not very surprising, since Obama’s aim is to convince the audience why the PA is 
necessary, and hence providing reasons for the decision made more sense. Obama aims 
to legitimate why the PA is good and why it is necessary to be part of it. The opposite 
choice would be to highlight more the negative implications of not joining the agreement, 
but Obama chooses to focus on the positive side. On the contrary, Trump aims to justify 
why the US should leave the agreement and providing reasons against instead of for the 
PA fits better with this objective. Trump focuses mostly on the negative impacts of the 
US staying in the agreement instead of describing what good will happen if the US leaves 
the PA. In order to answer the two other questions in detail, I will now compare the 
legitimation use of both presidents.  
 
Firstly, there is a difference of amount with the use of authorization. For Obama, the 
strategy is not very common and he uses only personal authority, whereas Trump employs 
the strategy often, as both personal and impersonal authority. With personal authority, 
both presidents use self-reference (their own institutional position as the POTUS) to 
legitimate the decision (examples 27 and 60-63). Interestingly, Obama and Trump use 
the verb believe very differently: for Obama it is he who does the action (I believe), while 
Trump is urging the audience to do the action (believe me). In addition, both presidents 
refer to other persons (or entities mirrored as persons) to gain authorization. With 
impersonal authority, Trump refers to the legal challenges of the US adopting the PA 
(example 66), while Obama does not mention the bypassing of the Senate at all (see 
section 2.2). As was mentioned in section 2.2, Republicans criticised the adoption 
procedure of the PA, and this might be the reason why Obama does not want to draw 
attention to the issue.  
 
What was surprising is that Trump did not use the legal aspect (bypassing the Senate) as 
legitimation as much as I initially thought. This could be due to the fact that most of the 
audience, both Americans and the international audience, were not aware of the specifics 
of adopting the PA and hence did not know about the legal aspects. By not focusing on 
this, Trump is able to turn the attention to other issues that would generate more emotions 
and the wanted response in the audience, such as economic matters or a threat in the 
future. Related to authorization and economic issues, Trump also uses numbers to make 
the information he conveys seem more truthful. However, as was mentioned in section 
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6.2, the expert information Trump is quoting is debatable. On contrary, Obama does not 
refer to numbers in his statements.  
 
With the use of mythopoesis, storytelling, there is also a clear difference between the two 
presidents. Obama employs narratives multiple times, but in Trump's statement these, 
especially explicit ones, are not common. However, both presidents use the strategy in a 
similar way, albeit with different motives. Both have a cautionary tale describing what 
will happen if the action the president is aiming to justify is not accomplished (examples 
33 and 69). In addition, both use a moral tale to tell what positive actions have already 
been done and how the current action would continue in this line. For both presidents, the 
decisions to either join the PA or withdraw from it are a continuum of past policies. For 
Obama, joining the PA would continue in the path of other previous acts done to tackle 
climate change and decrease emissions (example 33). Throughout his statements, Obama 
describes how climate action has been a key priority for his administration from the 
beginning of the presidency; hence, the PA is the natural next step for him. As came clear 
in section 3.2, the Obama administration did issue multiple climate change related 
policies. For Trump, withdrawing from the PA would mark another action promised 
during his presidential campaign (example 73). Since the beginning of the presidency in 
January 2017 Trump administration has aimed to rollback Obama era climate policies in 
favour of the fossil fuel industry9, and the PA represents one of these actions. 
 
A notable difference concerns the strategy of altruism. While Obama uses this very often, 
the strategy is completely absent from Trump's statement. As with the other strategies, 
Obama employs altruism mainly to legitimate, to describe the positive impacts of the PA 
for the next generations as opposed to focusing on what bad will happen if the PA is not 
successful. In his statements, Obama builds an image of the PA being the hope for the 
future generations (examples 36-40). For Trump, altruism is not present. He describes 
how the PA would be harmful for the US, his self-group, but does not mention how the 
action of withdrawing might be beneficial for others (outside the US). Trump only focuses 
on describing what good his action will bring to us (Americans). This line of thought 
                                                 
9 For example to replace the CPP with the Affordable Clean Energy Rule (see section 
3.2) 
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follows other policies the Trump administration is driving10 and especially the viewpoint 
of climate change policies being a hindrance to the domestic economy.  
 
As for hypothetical future, this strategy is more common for Trump than for Obama. Both 
presidents employ the strategy, but Trump's use is more frequent. All the examples of this 
strategy from Trump are delegitimations portraying a threatening future that would 
happen if the US stays in the agreement. In contrast, Obama uses hypothetical future 
mostly to legitimate the PA by describing what would happen if it were accomplished. 
Only one of the hypothetical future examples from Obama is a delegitimation (example 
32). This adds to the overall positive tone of Obama’s statements, since the negative 
future implications of not doing the action (joining and accomplishing the PA) are not 
highlighted but rather the beneficial impacts of doing it.  
 
Both presidents use rationalization quite often, but for Trump the use is more evident. 
For both, instrumental rationality is more common than theoretical rationality, of which 
not many cases could be identified and therefore the subcategory is not fundamental to 
this discussion. With instrumental rationality, the presidents refer to very different goals, 
uses and effects of the action in question. Trump aims to rationalize the withdrawal with 
economic reasons (examples 67 and 68), while Obama's goals, uses and effects have more 
to do with climate and environmental related reasons (examples 51 and 54). As was 
explained in section 4.5, previous studies have found that economic rationale as a 
legitimation is often used to justify certain decisions and actions. For instance, Kekki 
(2018) examined legitimation in news media in relation to Chinese foreign direct 
investments in Africa and found that rationalizations based on the economic effects were 
very common. There are no clear examples from Obama with economic rationale, but, in 
example 33 (a case of mythopoesis) he mentions how climate actions issued by his 
administration have contributed to the creation of new jobs. With this he does not refer 
directly to the PA, and for this reason I have not classified it as a rationalization. 
Nevertheless, I wanted to note that there are some more implicit hints from Obama that 
relate to economic reasons.  
 
                                                 
10 For instance trade and foreign policies (Seligman 2018) 
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The strategy of moral evaluation is also quite common in both president's use. Cases of 
all three subcategories can be found in the statements: both use evaluative words, 
analogies and abstraction to (de)legitimate the respective action. However, the moral 
values or emotions Obama and Trump use differ from each other. Obama aims to inflict 
the feelings of common purpose, pride and hope, whereas Trump aims to employ the 
value of (un)fairness to create a certain response from the audience. Also Vaara (2014, 
511-512) found delegitimations by (un)fairness frequent in his study on the Eurozone 
crisis in Finland. These often related to the Us/Them polarization, which is also apparent 
in the cases of (un)fairness in Trump’s statement. 
 
Interesting here is that Trump mostly bases his claims of (un)fairness to arguments that 
are untrue or at least very unlikely to happen. In example 81, Trump compares the US to 
China and India, two countries, which according to Trump are more advantaged due to 
the PA. The countries have different NDCs due to their different national situations (see 
section 2.1). Therefore, it is not justified for Trump to claim that the US is at a 
disadvantage when the nation is responsible for more per capita emissions than India or 
China, or since the US is a more developed nation according to Human Development 
Index ranking (Rajamani 2017). This twisting of information happens with rationalization 
as well. For instance, Trump's use of the word restrictions (example 68) does not hold 
true, since the PA does not inflict any kind of restrictions for the signatories. The PA is 
based on NDCs and there is no obligation for the countries to actually achieve these (see 
section 2.1).  
 
All in all, the differences between the two presidents’ use of the legitimation strategies 
are more evident than the similarities. Obama relies more on legitimation and portraying 
the PA and its importance positively instead of using delegitimation and highlighting 
what bad consequences there would be, if the US does not join the agreement. Obama 
mostly uses altruism, mythopoesis and moral evaluation with rationalization closely 
behind to legitimate the PA and its importance. In contrast, Trump relies more on 
delegitimation describing what bad consequences there would be, if the US stays in the 
PA. Thus, instead of using legitimation and highlighting what good would come out of 
the withdrawal, Trump mainly focuses on the negative aspects of staying. He employs 
mostly the strategies of authorization, hypothetical future and rationalization as well as 
moral evaluation. The absence of altruism in Trump’s statement is not surprising 
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considering how Trump is favouring unilateralism and placing the US interests first 
(“America First”) in many other policy areas such as trade and foreign policy (Seligman 
2018).  
 
The findings indicate a correlation with the overall viewpoints of the main political 
parties. Obama's key message throughout the statements is in line with the Democratic 
Party's commitment to fight against climate change. Also Trump's stance is in line with 
GOP in seeing climate change related policies a hindrance to the US economy (see section 
3). This aligns with Pavone’s conclusion that Trump’s decision to withdraw from the PA 
is a continuum of other Republican policies (2018, 39). If a different Republican 
candidate would have been elected as President, the results might have been the same. 
For instance, Kemp predicted this by declaring how “any future Republican president is 
likely to repeal such an agreement” (2017, 88). However, as the survey results in section 
3.1 indicate, not all Republicans view climate change and humans’ role in causing it the 
same way. This reflects Van Boven, Ehret and Sherman’s (2018, 497; see section 3.1) 
conclusion that there is a “tendency to place party over policy” in the US climate politics.  
 
I will now come back to the other aim of the present study, testing how this kind of topic 
and data fits with the typology of legitimation strategies. The framework proved useful, 
however, it was occasionally challenging to place a case of legitimation to one specific 
category, and this then resulted in an overlap in the analysis. Especially recognizing and 
interpreting examples of moral evaluation and rationalization proved to be difficult at 
times. These two strategies cannot always be pinpointed to a specific word or phrase, 
which made the identification challenges. In addition, Van Leeuwen’s examples of the 
strategies (see section 4.3) did not provide great assistance, since they centre around a 
completely different topic, and thus I could not use them as reference as such. In some 
cases of moral evaluation and rationalization, I was able to categorize a legitimation into 
a main strategy, but not clearly into any subcategory. By contrast, especially cases of 
authorization, altruism and hypothetical future were easier to identify.  
 
As was mentioned in section 4.5, Saarinen (2013) has also tested Van Leeuwen’s 
legitimation theory in her thesis and found that it did not work as well with her material 
as with the original. Saarinen (2013, 64) notes on the success of her study:  
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“Because there were so many songs which could not be categorized in a 
meaningful way into any of the four main strategies or their subcategories, 
the conclusion is either that a new category or subcategory ought to be 
developed, or that the strategies of the de/legitimation function best with a 
different thematic or corpus.”  
 
This is similar to what I might have concluded, had I also employed only Van Leeuwen’s 
strategies. In that case, there would have been more ambiguous cases, which I could not 
have been able to place clearly in one category. However, I ended up using a combined 
typology of legitimation strategies by Van Leeuwen and Reyes, which provided more 
comprehensive findings. I initially tried applying only Van Leeuwen’s strategies (just like 
Saarinen), but this turned out unsatisfactory. Therefore, I opted for additional categories 
from Reyes. This combination proved successful and generated better results than 
applying strategies from only one researcher. By using only Van Leeuwen’s work, there 
would have been a danger of trying to place a case of legitimation to any of the four 
categories, even though it might not have fit well. By contrast, with additional categories 
from Reyes, cases of altruism and hypothetical future were easier to identify. Though, I 
have to note that hypothetical future could be placed under mythopoesis as “alternative 
future projections” (terminology used by Vaara 2014, 512) or as mythopoetic past or 
future temporalization (used by Bogain 2017, 493). However, this might exclude some 
cases of hypothetical future since not all have story-like features.  
 
Based on my experience with this study, I must conclude that the most fruitful results 
might have resulted had I approached the data without any prior legitimation strategy 
typology and examined what legitimation patterns emerged from it, and then formed my 
own classification. I see some of Van Leeuwen’s subcategories too rigid and narrow, and 
in the end would have preferred to classify the strategies on a higher level or in 
combination with others. As was mentioned above, especially cases of moral evaluation 
and rationalization were at times difficult to classify to specific subcategory. Hence, there 
is room for further development on and application of discursive legitimation. Some 
research has already been conducted. For instance, in their study on discursive 
legitimation strategies used by the Portuguese government, Fonseca and Ferreira (2015) 
did not use any ready-made classifications but formed their own. Bogain (2017) also used 
Van Leeuwen’s categories in her study, however, she did not employ them rigorously but 
rather applied them to her own data. For instance, she analysed mythopoesis as part of 
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moral evaluation, since she considered this to work better in her study (Bogain 2017, 
490). 
 
As with many classifications, there is a danger with too narrow categories that something 
is missed or misinterpreted in the analysis. I aimed to overcome this with the combination 
of categories from two different researchers. I have also presented ambiguous cases (see 
examples 58, 59, 86 and 87) to indicate that not all legitimations are easy to classify into 
one category. However, in order to examine what kind of legitimation strategies the 
presidents use, a classification of some sort is needed, and for this I consider the typology 
of the present study a suitable one albeit with certain limitations.  
 
In addition, one must be careful not to over-simplify and over-interpret the results. The 
amount of data was not extensive. However, all possible data was included in the study 
(see section 5.1). Also, there was an imbalance of data from Obama (61,3 %) and Trump 
(38,7 %), which is important to keep in mind. However, I aimed to overcome this by not 
focusing on the total amount of each strategy in the statements of each president. Rather, 
I have focused on comparing what were the overall patterns of each president’s use of the 
legitimation strategies.  
 
The results of the study apply for this data and should not be used to generalize how 
Obama and Trump legitimate their other actions. It is possible that they employ the 
strategies similarly in other presidential statements, and future research could delve into 
this. Even though I have been rigorous in the analysis, there is a possibility to interpret 
the data in another way. For instance, as a non-American, my interpretation may differ 
from a one conducted by an American. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to examine how two US presidents (Barack Obama and Donald Trump) 
from two different political parties aimed to (de)legitimate their respective decisions 
regarding the Paris Agreement on Climate Change – either to join the agreement or to 
withdraw from it. The US under Obama administration first adopted the climate 
agreement at COP21 in 2015. However, Trump administration announced its intention to 
withdraw from the agreement in 2017.  
 
In the study, the two presidents' uses of different legitimation strategies were compared 
to see how they differed from or resembled each other. The study also aimed to examine 
how the used strategies related to a broader context. In addition, this thesis set out to test 
how well the typology of legitimation strategies would work with the data and topic of 
this study. The legitimation strategy framework had not been applied with a similar topic 
in any prior research, and hence this provided an interesting research gap. 
 
In order to do all this, I combined legitimation strategies identified by two researchers, 
Van Leeuwen (2007 and 2008) and Reyes (2011) to form a typology of strategies. This 
theoretical framework was then used to analyse the data, five presidential statements, 
through a method of close reading. The method enabled a detailed analysis of the data as 
regards to the legitimation strategies and their comparison.  
 
The study found that in order to legitimate the PA and its importance, Obama employed 
mostly altruism, mythopoesis and moral evaluation followed by the strategy of 
rationalization. According to the analysis, Trump, on the other hand, employed mostly 
authorization, hypothetical future and rationalization as well as moral evaluation. 
Examples of all the legitimation strategies were found in Obama’s statements, and all 
except cases of altruism were found in Trump’s statement. This was an interesting 
difference between the two presidents. 
 
The comparison revealed that while there were both differences and similarities in the use 
of the legitimation strategies between the two presidents, the differences were more 
noteworthy than the similarities. Obama used mostly legitimation and aimed to convey a 
positive image of the climate agreement and the possible future it would guarantee, while 
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Trump employed more delegitimation by describing the negative aspects of staying in the 
agreement. Obama highlighted the environmental benefits and the better prospects of the 
next generations, whereas Trump focused on the domestic economy implications of the 
PA. These viewpoints appeared to reflect the positions of the respective political parties, 
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The Democrats mostly consider climate 
change policy a key priority, and president Obama’s actions are in line with this. From 
the beginning of his time in office, Obama administration aimed to make the US a leader 
in climate change politics and many of the climate actions it issued, the PA included, 
reflect this. Similarly, Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the PA follows 
the general view among Republicans that climate policies are a burden to the economy 
and should not be a priority.  
 
As for testing the framework, it was concluded that the combination of strategies from 
Van Leeuwen and Reyes was more successful than applying strategies from only one 
researcher. This made sure that the classification was not too narrow, and that the cases 
of legitimation were not forced into a specific category with too weak connections. Using 
only Van Leeuwen’s strategies, which was the first idea, most likely would have made 
the classification of the strategies more difficult. Therefore, Reyes’s contributions were 
also taken into the typology.  
 
This study has limited amount of data. Further research could examine a larger corpus to 
see for instance how other politicians of the Democratic and Republicans parties aim to 
legitimate the decisions related to the PA or broaden the focus to other climate and energy 
related policies. This kind of research could open up possibilities for more generalizable 
results and for valuable insights into whether similar legitimation strategies are employed. 
The topic of the PA is still very current, and time will tell whether the US eventually 
withdraws from the agreement. These further developments provide room for more 
research. 
 
The absence of the strategy of altruism from Trump’s use could also provide an 
interesting viewpoint in further research. In addition, future research could test and 
develop the legitimation strategy framework further, since it clearly provides many 
fascinating research possibilities. There is a possibility of creating one’s own legitimation 
framework based on earlier work. 
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The study proved that the typology of legitimation strategies can be applied successfully 
to a data and topic of this kind, albeit some of the limitations it entails. Further research 
is still needed to better examine how the framework could work with other topics and 
data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
References 
 
Primary sources 
 
Obama, Barack. 2015a. “Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21.” 
White House Archives. Accessed 20 September 2018. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-
president-obama-first-session-cop21. 
––––. 2015b. “Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement.” White 
House Archives. Accessed 20 September 2018. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/12/statement-
president-paris-climate-agreement. 
––––. 2016a. “Remarks by President Obama on the United States Formally Entering 
into the Paris Agreement.” White House Archives. Accessed 20 September 2018. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/04/remarks-
president-obama-united-states-formally-entering-paris-agreement. 
––––. 2016b. “Remarks by the President on the Paris Agreement.” White House 
Archives. Accessed 20 September 2018. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/05/remarks-
president-paris-agreement. 
Trump, Donald. 2017a. “Statement by President Trump on Paris Climate Accord.” The 
White House. Accessed 20 September 2018. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-
paris-climate-accord/. 
 
Secondary sources  
 
The Associated Press. 2017. "GOP senators Want US to Pull Out of Paris Climate 
Accord." The New York Times, 25 May. Accessed 15 October 2018. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170603183319/https://www.nytimes.com/aponline
/2017/05/25/us/politics/ap-us-united-states-climate-change.html. 
 76 
BBC News. 2016. “Trump would ‘cancel’ Paris climate deal.” BBC News, 27 May. 
Accessed 6 November 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-
36401174. 
Beetham, David. 1991. The Legitimation of Power. Atlantic Highlands (NJ): 
Humanities Press. 
Berger, P. and T. Luckmann. [1966] 1987. The Social Construction of Reality. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bogain, Ariane. 2017. "Security in the Name of Human Rights: The Discursive 
Legitimation Strategies of the War on Terror in France." Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 10.3: 476-500. Accessed 25 September 2018. Taylor & Francis Online. 
Brewer, Paul R. 2012. "Polarisation in the USA: Climate Change, Party Politics, and 
Public Opinion in the Obama Era." European Political Science 11(1): 7-17. 
Accessed 5 November 2018. ProQuest Central. 
Cama, Timothy. 2015. "GOP doubtful about Paris climate talks." The Hill, 18 
November. Accessed 1 October 2018. https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/260568-gop-doubtful-about-paris-climate-talks.  
––––. 2016. "Senate GOP tries to throw cold water on Paris climate deal." The Hill, 21 
April. Accessed 1.10.2018. https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/277167-senate-gop-tries-to-throw-cold-water-on-paris-climate-deal. 
Chilton, Paul. 2004. Analyzing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. New York: 
Routledge. 
Climate Action Tracker. 2018. "USA country profile." Accessed 6 November 2018. 
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/. 
Cooper, Mark. 2018. “Governing the global climate commons: The political economy 
of state and local action, after the U.S. flip-flop on the Paris Agreement.” Energy 
Policy 118: 440-454. Accessed 26 October 2018. ScienceDirect. 
Democratic Party Platform. 2016. Accessed 5 November 2018. 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf. 
Dunlap, Riley E. and Aaron M. McCright. 2008. "A Widening Gap: Republican and 
Democratic Views on Climate Change." Environment: Science and Policy for 
Sustainable Development 50(5): 26-35. Accessed 29 October 2018. Taylor & 
Francis Online. 
Dunlap, Riley E., Aaron M. McCright and Jerrod H. Yarosh. 2016. “The Political 
Divide on Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S.” 
 77 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 58(5): 4-23. 
Accessed 29 October 2018. Academic Search Premier. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2017. "Summary of the Clean Air Act." 
Accessed 1 November 2018. https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-
clean-air-act. 
––––. 2018. “FACT SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan." Accessed 1 
November 2018. https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-
clean-power-plan.html. 
Falkner, Robert. 2016. “The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate 
politics.” International Affairs, 92(5): 1107-1125. Accessed 5 October 2018. 
Academic Search Premier. 
Feldman, Lauren, P. Sol Hart and Tijana Milosevic. 2017. "Polarizing news? 
Representations of threat and efficacy in leading US newspapers’ coverage of 
climate change." Public Understanding of Science 26(4): 481-497. Accessed 23 
February 2019. SAGE Journals. 
Fonseca, Pedro and Maria Joao Ferreira. 2015 "Through ‘seas never before sailed’: 
Portuguese government discursive legitimation strategies in a context of financial 
crisis." Discourse & Society 26(6): 682-711. Accessed 28 September 2018. SAGE 
Journals. 
Foucault, Michel. 1978. The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1, An Introduction New York: 
Pantheon Books.  
Global Carbon Atlas. 2019. "CO2 emissions." Accessed 15 February 2019. 
http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions. 
Green Climate Fund. 2018. “About the fund.” Accessed 5 November 2018. 
https://www.greenclimate.fund/who-we-are/about-the-fund. 
Habermas, J. 1976. Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann. 
Halliday, M.A.K. 1985. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Arnold. 
Henry, Devin. 2017a. "Businesses pressure Trump to stay in Paris climate deal." The 
Hill, 12 April. Accessed 1 October 2018. https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/328356-businesses-pressure-trump-to-stay-in-paris-climate-deal. 
––––. 2017b. "Senate Democrats push Trump to stay in Paris climate deal." The Hill, 24 
May. Accessed 1 October 2018. https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/334918-senate-democrats-tell-trump-to-stay-in-paris-climate-deal.  
 78 
Hermville, Lukas. 2016. “Climate Change as a Transformation Challenge: A New 
Climate Policy Paradigm?” Gaia 25(1), 19-22. Accessed 5 November 2018. 
ProQuest Central. 
Holden, Emily, Dylan Brown, Benjamin Storrow and Scott Waldman. 2017. “Factcheck 
Shows Trump’s Climate Speech Was Full of Misleading Statements.” Scientific 
American, 2 June. Accessed 16 February 2019. 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/factcheck-shows-trumps-climate-
speech-was-full-of-misleading-statements/. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2018. "Special report: Global 
Warming of 1.5 °C.” Accessed 19 November 2018. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
Kekki, Meri. 2018. “Legitimizing foreign direct investments: A discursive perspective 
on sustainability of Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa.” MA Thesis, 
Turku School of Economics. 
Kemp, Luke. 2016. “Bypassing the ‘ratification straitjacket’: reviewing US legal 
participation in a climate agreement.” Climate Policy 16(8): 1011-1028. Accessed 
26 October 2018. Taylor & Francis Online. 
––––. 2017a. “US-proofing the Paris Climate Agreement.” Climate Policy 17(1): 86-
101. Accessed 26 October 2018. Taylor & Francis Online. 
––––. 2017b. “Limiting the climate impact of the Trump administration.” Palgrave 
Communications 3(1): 1-5. Accessed 14 December 2018. ProQuest Central. 
Kienast, Andrea N. 2015. “Consensus Behind Action: The Fate of the Paris Agreement 
in the United States of America.” Carbon & Climate Law Review 9(4): 314-327. 
Accessed 26 October 2018. Academic Search Premier. 
Luckmann, Thomas. 1987. “Comments on Legitimation.” Current Sociology 35(2): 
109-117. Accessed 16 March 2019. SAGE Journals. 
Mackay, R. R. 2015. "Multimodal legitimation: Selling Scottish independence." 
Discourse & Society 26(3), 323-348. Accessed 28 September 2018. SAGE 
Journals. 
Mathiesen, Karl. 2017. “Obama sends $500m to UN climate fund.” Climate Home 
News, 17 January. Accessed 6 November 2018. 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/01/17/obama-signs-over-500m-to-un-
climate-fund/. 
Milman, Oliver. 2015. “James Hansen, father of climate change awareness, calls Paris 
talks ‘fraud’”. The Guardian, 12 December. Accessed 5 November 2018. 
 79 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/james-hansen-climate-
change-paris-talks-fraud. 
NDC Registry. 2016. "USA First NDC" UNFCCC. Accessed 24 September 2018. 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States
%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf. 
Obama for America. 2008. “Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America.” 
US Department of Energy. Accessed 2 November 2018. 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pd
f. 
Oddo, John. 2011. “War legitimation discourse: Representing ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in four 
US presidential addresses.” Discourse & Society 22(3): 287-314. Accessed 28 
September 2018. SAGE Journals. 
Pavone, Ilja Richard. 2018. “The Paris Agreement and the Trump administration: Road 
to nowhere?” Journal of International Studies 11(1): 34-49. Accessed 24 
September 2018. Directory of Open Access Journals. 
Pianin, Eric. 2014. “Pros and Cons of Obama’s New Carbon Rule.” The Fiscal Times, 2 
June. Accessed 29 October 2018. 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/06/02/Pros-and-Cons-Obama-s-
New-Carbon-Rule. 
Pickering, Jonathan, Jeffrey S. McGee, Tim Stephens and Sylvia I. Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen. 2018. “The impact of the US retreat from the Paris Agreement: 
Kyoto revisited?” Climate Policy 18(7): 818-827. Accessed 26 October 2018. 
Taylor & Francis Online. 
Rajamani, Lavanya. 2016. “Ambition and differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: 
interpretative possibilities and underlying politics.” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 65: 493-514. Accessed 26 October 2018. ProQuest 
Central. 
––––. 2017. “Reflections on the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change 
Agreement.” EJIL Talk!, 5 June. Accessed 24 September 2018. 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/reflections-on-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-
change-agreement/. 
Reyes, Antonio. 2011. “Strategies of legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words 
to Actions.” Discourse & Society 22(6): 781-807. Accessed 28 September 2018. 
SAGE Journals. 
 80 
Ritchie, Hannah and Max Roser. 2017. "CO2 and other Greenhouse Gas Emissions." 
Our World in Data. Accessed 3 November 2018. https://ourworldindata.org/co2-
and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions. 
Rojo, L. Martín and T.A. Van Dijk. 1997. ‘“There was a Problem, and it was Solved!”: 
Legitimating the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Immigrants in Spanish Parliamentary 
Discourse." Discourse & Society 8(4): 523–67. Accessed 28 September 2018. 
SAGE Journals. 
Saarinen, Heidi. 2013. “From War Pigs to Unsung Heroes: The Criticism and 
Justification of War in Metal Lyrics”. MA Thesis, University of Turku. 
Seligman, Lara. 2018. “Trump’s America First Policy Could Leave U.S. Defence 
Industry Behind.” Foreign Policy, 18 July. Accessed 27 March 2019. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/18/trumps-america-first-policy-could-leave-u-
s-defense-industry-behind/. 
Statista. 2019. "Leading daily newspapers in the United States as of September 2017, by 
circulation." Accessed 28 January 2019. https://www-statista-
com.ezproxy.utu.fi/statistics/184682/us-daily-newspapers-by-circulation/. 
Trump, Donald. 2017b. "Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth." The White House, 28 March. Accessed 1 
November 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/. 
UNFCCC. 1992. "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." 
Accessed 24 September 2018. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/conveng.pdf. 
––––. 2015. "The Paris Agreement." Accessed 24 September 2018. 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement
_english.pdf. 
––––. 2018a. "What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?" 
Accessed 24 September 2018. https://unfccc.int/bigpicture. 
––––. 2018b. "Conference of the Parties (COP)." Accessed 24 September 2018. 
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop.  
Urpelainen, Johannes and Thijs Van de Graaf. 2018. “United States non-cooperation 
and the Paris agreement.” Climate Policy 18(7): 839-851. Accessed 5 November 
2018. Taylor & Francis Online.  
 81 
US Congress. 2009. "H.R.2454 – American Clean Energy and Security act of 2009." 
Congress.gov. Accessed 1 November 2018. https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-
congress/house-bill/2454. 
US Constitution. 2018. "The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription." 
National Archives. Accessed on 3 November 2018. 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript. 
Vaara, Eero. 2014. “Struggles over Legitimacy in the Eurozone Crisis: Discursive 
Legitimation Strategies and Their Ideological Underpinnings.” Discourse & 
Society 25(4): 500-518. Accessed 28 September 2018. SAGE Journals. 
Van Boven, Leaf, Phillip J. Ehret and David K. Sherman. 2018. “Psychological Barriers 
to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy.” Perspectives on Psychological 
Science 13(4): 492-507. Accessed 29 October 2018. SAGE Journals. 
Van Dijk, T.A. 1988. News as Discourse. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
––––. 1998. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: SAGE. 
Van Leeuwen, Theo and Ruth Wodak. 1999. “Legitimizing Immigration Control: A 
Discourse-Historical Analysis.” Discourse Studies 1(1): 83-118. Accessed 15 
September 2018. SAGE Journals. 
Van Leeuwen, Theo. 2007. “Legitimation in discourse and communication.” Discourse 
& Communication 1(1): 91-112. Accessed 15 September 2018. SAGE Journals. 
––––. 2008. Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Accessed 15 September 2018. ProQuest Ebrary. 
Weber, Max. 1964. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: The 
Free Press. 
The White House. 2014. "U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change." White 
House Archives, 11 November. Accessed 15 October 2018. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-
announcement-climate-change. 
World Resources Institute (WRI). 2018. “FAQs About How the Paris Agreement Enters 
into Force.” Accessed 24 September 2018. https://www.wri.org/faqs-about-how-
paris-agreement-enters-force. 
Zhang, Hai-Bin, Han-Cheng Dai, Hua-Xia Lai and Wen-Tao Wang. 2017. “U.S. 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts and China’s response.” 
Advances in Climate Change research 8(4): 220-225. Accessed 16 February 
2019. ScienceDirect.
 Finnish summary 
 
 
Ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutukset ovat jo osa ihmisten elämää ympäri maailmaa ja tieteellinen 
näyttö ihmisten aiheuttamasta ilmaston lämpenemisestä lisääntyy koko ajan (IPCC 2018). 
Ilmastonmuutos on globaali ongelma, johon vastaamiseksi tarvitaan kansainvälistä 
yhteistyötä. Tätä varten luotiin ilmastonmuutosta koskeva YK:n puitesopimus (UNFCCC) 
1990-luvun alussa. Puitesopimuksen tarkoituksena oli kehittää globaali vastaus 
ilmastonmuutosta vastaan. UNFCCC aloitti pitkän taipaleen kohti yhteistä kansainvälistä 
ilmastopolitiikkaa. Lukuisten neuvottelujen jälkeen Pariisin ilmastosopimus saavutettiin 
joulukuussa 2015 UNFCCC:n osapuolten Pariisin ilmastonmuutoskokouksessa (COP21). 
Sopimuksen tavoitteena on puuttua ilmaston lämpenemiseen, vauhdittaa ilmastonmuutoksen 
hillitsemistä ja siihen sopeutumista sekä varmistaa riittävä rahoitus näiden toimien 
toteuttamiseksi.  
 
Pariisin sopimus ei aseta kaikille yhteisiä sitovia päästövähennystavoitteita, vaan jokainen 
sopimuksen osapuoli määrittää omat kansalliset velvoitteensa. Näitä on määrä tarkastella 
viiden vuoden välein. Sopimus velvoittaa mukana olevat valtiot asettamaan ja ylläpitämään 
tavoitteensa, mutta ei aseta selkeää vaatimusta näiden tavoitteiden lopullisesta 
vaatimuksesta. 
 
Yhdysvallat on maailmanpolitiikan supervalta sekä maailman toiseksi suurin 
hiilidioksidipäästöjen aiheuttaja. Yhdysvaltojen mukanaolo Pariisin sopimuksessa nähtiin 
oleellisena sen onnistumiselle, sillä maan kanta toimisi esimerkkinä muille valtioille. 
Yhdysvalloissa on vallinnut jo pitkään selkeä jako kahden valtapuolueen välillä siinä, miten 
puolueet suhtautuvat ilmastonmuutokseen ja erityisesti ihmisten rooliin sen aiheuttajana. 
Tutkimusten mukaan demokraatit uskovat enemmän ihmisten aiheuttamaan ilmaston 
lämpenemiseen kuin republikaanit, joilla on tapana priorisoida taloutta ilmaston 
kustannuksella. Demokraatit ovatkin olleet halukkaampia ajamaan ilmastonmuutokseen 
liittyvää politiikkaa. 
 
Vuonna 2015 demokraattisen puolueen Barack Obama oli Yhdysvaltojen presidenttinä ja 
johdatti maan mukaan ilmastosopimukseen. Obaman hallinto oli aktiivisesti mukana Pariisin 
sopimuksen laatimisessa, sillä sopimus piti muotoilla Yhdysvaltoja varten tietynlaiseksi. 
 Maan hallintorakenteesta johtuen, kansainvälisten sitovien sopimusten hyväksyntä on usein 
hankalaa, sillä kaksi kolmasosaa senaatista tulee tukea tätä päätöstä. Pariisin sopimuksen 
laadinnan aikaan senaatin enemmistö oli vastapuolue republikaanien hallinnassa. Obama ei 
olisi saanut ehdotustaan läpi, joten hallinto päätti käyttää presidentin toimeenpanovaltaa 
ohittamalla senaatin. Pariisin sopimus muotoiltiin vähemmän sitovaksi kuin kansainväliset 
sopimukset yleensä. Näin Obaman hallinnon oli mahdollista hyväksyä se ”presidentin 
sopimuksena” (presidential executive agreement). Yhdysvaltojen hallinto kuitenkin vaihtui, 
ja vuonna 2017 seuraava presidentti, republikaani Donald Trump, ilmoitti aikeistaan vetää 
Yhdysvallat pois Pariisin sopimuksesta. Päätöstä oli edeltänyt kiivas spekulointi uuden 
hallinnon mahdollisista toimista ilmastosopimuksen suhteen.  
 
Tämä Pro Gradu -tutkielma selvitti, kuinka nämä kaksi Yhdysvaltojen presidenttiä kahdesta 
eri puolueesta yrittävät legitimoida Pariisin ilmastosopimukseen liittyvät päätöksensä. On 
tärkeää tutkia, kuinka Yhdysvaltojen johto oikeuttaa päätöksiään, sillä maan aseman takia 
näillä päätöksillä voi olla kauaskantoisia vaikutuksia. Tutkielma pyrki vastaamaan 
seuraaviin kolmeen tutkimuskysymykseen: 
 
1. Mitä diskursiivisia legitimaatiostrategioita presidentit Barack Obama ja Donald 
Trump käyttävät oikeuttaakseen päätöksensä joko liittää Yhdysvallat sopimukseen 
tai vetää maa pois siitä? 
2. Kuinka presidenttien strategioiden käyttö eroaa tai muistuttaa toisiaan? 
3. Kuinka nämä käytetyt strategiat liittyvät laajempaan sosiopoliittiseen kontekstiin, 
erityisesti Yhdysvaltojen eri hallintojen ja kahden eri valtapuolueen 
ilmastopolitiikkaan? 
 
Vastatakseni kahteen ensimmäiseen tutkimuskysymykseen muodostin teoreettisen 
viitekehyksen kahden eri tutkijan kehittelemistä legitimaatiostrategioista. Van Leeuwenin 
(2007 ja 2008) mukaan legitimaatio vastaa kysymyksiin ”miksi meidän pitäisi tehdä tämä” 
ja ”miksi meidän pitäisi tehdä tämä tällä tavoin”. Legitimaatiossa ihmiset siis yrittävät 
oikeuttaa käytöstään argumenteilla, jotka selittävät heidän toimiaan, ideoitaan ja ajatuksiaan. 
Legitimaation päämääränä on jokin tavoite, joka yleensä tarkoittaa tuen tai hyväksynnän 
saamista jollekin toimelle tai päätökselle.  
 
 Erityisesti poliittisessa diskurssissa legitimaatio on oleellinen ja vahvasti läsnä. Varsinkin 
tilanteissa, joissa jokin poliittinen päätös tai toimi on ristiriitainen, legitimaatio on 
tarpeellinen. Esimerkiksi tämän tutkielman aihe, Pariisin ilmastosopimus, oli ristiriitainen 
Yhdysvalloissa. Republikaanit kritisoivat sopimusta Obaman hallinnon aikana, ja myös 
Trump kohtasi kritiikkiä sekä ennen vetäytymispäätöstä että sen jälkeen.  
 
Legitimaatio tapahtuu lähinnä diskursiivisesti, joko puheessa tai tekstissä, mutta se on 
kuitenkin myös riippuvainen kontekstista. Useimmat tutkijat painottavatkin, että 
legitimaatio liittyy vahvasti yhteiskunnassa vallitseviin yhteisiin normeihin ja arvoihin sekä 
siihen yhteiseen tietoon, joka yhteiskunnan jäsenillä on. Onkin hyvä pitää mielessä, että 
kaikki syyt tai perustelut eivät välttämättä aina ole legitimaatioita.  
 
Legitimaatiossa yritetään puolustaa, oikeuttaa ja selittää omia tekoja, jotka pyritään 
esittämään mahdollisimman positiivisesti. Delegitimaatio sen sijaan tarkoittaa vastapuolen 
tekojen murtamista omien toimien korostamiseksi. Vastapuoli esitetään negatiivisesti ja 
toimet tai päätökset mahdottomiksi hyväksyä.  
 
Käytän tutkielmassa ensisijaisesti Van Leeuwenin legitimaatiostrategioita. Hän erottelee 
neljä pääkategoriaa ja näille alakategorioita. Ensimmäinen strategia on auktoriteettiin 
vetoaminen, missä nimenmukaisesti legitimaatio pyritään saamaan vetoamalla johonkin 
tiettyyn auktoriteettiin. Tämä auktoriteetti voi perustua henkilöön, esimerkiksi hänen 
statukseensa tai asiantuntijuuteensa. Auktoriteetti voi kuitenkin perustua muuhun kuin 
henkilöön, esimerkiksi perinteeseen tai lakiin. Moraalinen arviointi tai moraalillistaminen 
on toinen Van Leeuwenin strategioista. Moraalinen arviointi perustuu tunteisiin ja arvoihin. 
Van Leeuwenin alakategorioita ovat arviointi (esimerkiksi adjektiivien tai substantiivien 
avulla), abstraktio ja analogia eli vertailu. Tätä strategiaa voi olla paikoin vaikeampi 
tunnistaa kuin auktoriteettia, sillä moraalinen arviointi saattaa sisältyä pitempään 
diskurssinkatkelmaan yksittäisten sanojen lisäksi.  
 
Van Leeuwenin kolmas strategia on järkeistäminen, joka moraalillistamista vastoin perustuu 
järkeen, ei tunteisiin. Legitimaatio kumpuaa siitä, kuinka hyödyllinen jokin asia on. 
Järkeistämistä on Van Leeuwenin mielestä kahta erityyppistä: välineellinen ja teoreettinen. 
Näistä ensimmäinen perustuu legitimaation alaisena olevan asian tavoitteisiin, 
käyttötarkoituksiin ja vaikutuksiin. Jälkimmäinen taas liittyy asioiden luonnonjärjestykseen. 
 Näillä kahdella kategorialla on vielä omat alakategoriansa. Viimeinen strategia, jonka Van 
Leeuwen erittelee, on mythopoeesi eli tarinankerronta. Tässä legitimaatio pohjaa 
tarinallisiin elementteihin. Moraalisessa tarinassa hyvät teot palkitaan ja varoittavassa 
tarinassa yleensä esitetään, mitä tapahtuu, jos legitimoinnin alla olevaa toimintaa ei toteuteta.  
 
Näiden neljän strategian lisäksi otin typologiaani mukaan Reyesin (2011) viisi 
legitimaatiostrategiaa, jotta kategorisointi ei olisi liian kapea. Ensimmäisessä strategiassa 
legitimaatio pyritään saamaan vetoamalla erilaisiin tunteisiin, esimerkiksi pelkoon. Reyesin 
toinen strategia on altruismi, jossa legitimaation alaisena oleva teko yritetään esittää 
mahdollisimman hyödyllisenä muille, eikä vain itselle. Kolmas strategia, hypoteettinen 
tulevaisuus, pohjaa siihen, että jokin asia (yleensä uhka) tulevaisuudessa esitetään vaativan 
välittömiä tekoja tässä hetkessä ja siksi nämä teot ovat oikeutettuja. Reyesin kaksi 
viimeisintä strategiaa liittyvät vahvasti Van Leeuwenin kategorioihin: järkeistäminen ja 
vetoaminen asiantuntemukseen tai asiantuntijuuteen. Nämä ovat lähes samanlaisia kuin 
aiemmin mainitut Van Leeuwenin järkeistäminen ja auktoriteettiin vetoaminen. 
 
Aiempana mainittujen kolmen tutkimuskysymyksen lisäksi, tutkielman yksi tavoitteista oli 
myös testata, kuinka hyvin legitimaatiotypologia toimii tutkielman aiheen ja materiaalin 
kanssa. Van Leeuwenin strategioita on käytetty aiemmin esimerkiksi uutismediadiskurssin 
tutkimuksessa, mutta aiempia tutkimuksia legitimaatiosta Yhdysvaltojen presidenttien 
retoriikassa ei juuri löytynyt. Tämä tarjosi siis mielenkiintoisen tutkimusraon.  
 
Tutkielman aineistona oli yhteensä viisi puhetta, joista neljä Obamalta ja yksi Trumpilta. 
Tämä epätasapaino johtuu siitä, että tutkittavien puheiden tuli liittyä selkeästi ja ainoastaan 
Pariisin ilmastosopimukseen, jotta presidenttien siihen liittyviä päätöksiä oli mahdollista 
tutkia kunnolla. Obama oli mukana sopimuksen neuvotteluissa pidemmän aikaa kuin 
Trump, joten luonnollisesti häneltä löytyi useampi puhe aiheesta. Trumpin ainoa lausunto 
on kuitenkin huomattavasti pidempi kuin Obaman keskimääräisesti, joten lopulta Obaman 
puheet edustivat 61,3 prosenttia tutkielman koko materiaalista Trumpin osuuden ollessa 38,7 
prosenttia. Analyysin metodina tässä Pro Gradu -tutkielmassa käytettiin lähilukua, sillä pieni 
määrä materiaali mahdollisti aineiston yksityiskohtaisen tarkastelun. 
 
Analysoin ensin molempien presidenttien legitimaatiostrategioiden käyttöä erikseen. 
Obaman puheista löytyi esimerkkejä kaikista kategorioista. Analyysin mukaan Obaman 
 eniten käytetyimmät strategiat olivat erityisesti altruismi, tarinankerronta sekä moraalinen 
arviointi. Myös järkeistämistä esiintyi suhteellisen usein. Trumpin puheesta taas löytyi 
esimerkkejä kaikista muista legitimaatiostrategioista paitsi altruismista. Trump käytti 
analyysin perusteella eniten auktoriteettiin vetoamista, hypoteettista tulevaisuutta sekä 
järkeistämistä. Seuraavaksi yleisin näiden kolmen strategian jälkeen oli moraalinen 
arviointi.  
 
Presidenttien vertailu osoitti, että strategioiden käytössä oli joitakin samankaltaisuuksia, 
esimerkiksi molemmat käyttivät tarinankerrontaa kertomalla varoittavan tarinan siitä, miten 
käy, jos ehdotettu päätös ei toteudu. Eroavaisuuksia oli kuitenkin enemmän kuin 
samankaltaisuuksia. Suurin ero oli legitimaation yleisluonteessa. Obama käytti lähinnä 
positiivista legitimaatiota puolustaakseen ja oikeuttaakseen, miksi Yhdysvaltojen ja muiden 
valtioiden tulee olla osana Pariisin ilmastosopimusta. Vaihtoehtona Obama olisi voinut 
keskittyä selittämään mitä kaikkia huonoja puolia olisi, jos Yhdysvallat ei olisi mukana 
sopimuksessa. Trump sitä vastoin käytti lähinnä delegitimaatiota selittääkseen juuri miksi 
Yhdysvaltojen ei tulisi olla mukana sopimuksessa. Vaihtoehtona Trump olisi voinut 
keskittyä esittämään, mitä hyviä puolia Yhdysvaltojen sopimuksesta vetäytymisessä olisi.  
 
Silmiinpistävä ero oli altruismin käytössä. Kuten ylempänä mainittiin, Trumpin puheesta ei 
löytynyt yhtään esimerkkiä altruismin strategiasta, kun taas Obama vetosi tähän hyvin paljon 
legitimaatiossaan. Obama yritti esittää Pariisin sopimuksen eräänlaisena tulevien 
sukupolvien toivona. Myös esimerkiksi auktoriteettiin vetoamisen strategian käytössä oli 
ero: Trump vetosi eri auktoriteetteihin huomattavasti useammin kuin Obama. Molemmat 
kuitenkin käyttivät omaa presidentillistä auktoriteettiasemaansa legitimaation pohjana. 
Yllättävää oli, että Trump vetosi oikeudellisiin perusteluihin odotettua vähemmän. Obama 
joutui ohittamaan Yhdysvaltojen senaatin saadakseen maan liittymään Pariisin 
sopimukseen. Oletin tämän perusteella, että Trump olisi käyttänyt tätä korttia enemmän 
legitimaation perustana. 
 
Toinen strategia, jota Trump käytti useammin kuin Obama, oli hypoteettinen tulevaisuus. 
Trumpin käytössä tämä strategia esiintyi delegitimaationa uhkaavan tulevaisuuden 
muodossa, kun taas Obama kuvasi lähinnä, millaisen paremman tulevaisuuden sopimuksen 
ilmastotavoitteiden onnistuminen toisi.  
 
 Molemmat presidentit käyttivät järkeistämistä, erityisesti välineellistä. Obama ja Trump 
vetosivat kuitenkin hyvin erilaisiin tavoitteisiin, käyttötapoihin ja vaikutuksiin. Obaman 
puheissa nämä olivat ilmastoon ja ympäristöön liittyviä, kun taas Trumpin puheessa 
järkeistäminen pohjasi taloudellisiin syihin. Myös moraalisen arvioinnin käyttö oli 
presidenttien puheissa määrällisesti suhteellisen samanlaista, mutta luonteeltaan erilaista. 
Obama pyrki vetoamaan ylpeyteen, toivoon ja sopimuksen yhteiseen tarkoitukseen. Trump 
sen sijaan vetosi epäoikeudenmukaisuuteen: Pariisin sopimus asettaisi Yhdysvallat 
epäreiluun asemaan muihin valtioihin nähden.  
 
Kaiken kaikkiaan molempien presidenttien legitimaatiot vaikuttavat analyysin perusteella 
heijastelevan heidän puolueidensa kantoja, mikä ei ollut yllättävä tulos. Trumpin kanta on 
yhteneväinen republikaanisen puolueen linjan kanssa siinä, että ilmastopolitiikan ei tule 
mennä kotimaan talouden ja kasvun edelle. Trumpin legitimaatiostrategioiden käyttö näyttää 
liittyvän vahvasti hänen hallintonsa yleiseen ”Yhdysvallat ensin” -politiikkaan. Myös 
Obaman pääviesti on linjassa demokraattisen puolueen ilmastopolitiikan kanssa. 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteena oli myös selvittää, kuinka hyvin legitimaatiotypologia sopi 
tämänkaltaisen aiheen ja aineiston tutkimiseen. Viitekehys osoittautui suhteellisen 
onnistuneeksi, vaikkakin ajoittain haasteelliseksi soveltaa. Aineistosta löytyi esimerkkejä 
kaikista kategorioista, mutta välillä joitakin legitimaatiotapauksia oli vaikea luokitella 
selkeästi tiettyyn kategoriaan. Kahden tutkijan strategioiden yhdistäminen kuitenkin vähensi 
epäselvien tapausten määrää, sillä kategorioita oli neljän sijaan kuusi (ja lisäksi tunteisiin 
vetoaminen yleiskattavana strategiana). Erityisen hankalaksi osoittautui moraalisen 
arvioinnin ja järkeistäminen luokittelu alakategorioihin. Haasteista ja rajoituksista 
huolimatta tämä tutkimus osoitti, että legitimaatioteoriaa on mahdollista soveltaa hyvin 
erilaiseen aiheeseen.  
 
Legitimaatioteoria ja tutkielman aihe tarjoavat mielenkiintoisia mahdollisuuksia 
lisätutkimukselle. Aiheen piiristä olisi mahdollista esimerkiksi laajentaa aineiston määrää ja 
tutkia, kuinka muut Yhdysvaltojen valtapuolueiden jäsenet legitimoivat Pariisin 
ilmastosopimukseen tai muuhun ilmastopolitiikkaan liittyviä päätöksiä. Legitimaatioteoriaa 
ja sen tarjoamia mahdollisuuksia tulee tarkastella lisää. Yksi mahdollisuus voisi olla oman 
legitimaatiokehyksen luominen valmiiden kategorioiden käytön sijaan.  
 
